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BETWEEN CHOICE AND TRADITION: 
RETHINKING REMEDIAL GRACE 
PERIODS AND UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
MANAGEMENT IN A COMPARATIVE LIGHT
Ming-Sung Kuo*
Abstract
Recent experiences of constitutional review in the common law 
world have received increasing attention in comparative constitutional 
law scholarship.  Looking beyond the common law jurisdictions, this 
Article investigates the influence of variations on unconstitutional-
ity management and changing constitutional politics on the functional 
mutation of remedial grace periods.  Through a case study of Taiwan 
in light of the comparison of the civilian-continental vs. common law 
models of constitutional review, it argues that legal tradition and the 
court’s role vis-à-vis the political branch in the dynamics of constitu-
tional politics jointly contribute to the multifunctional role of remedial 
grace periods in unconstitutionality management.  As part of unconstitu-
tionality management across constitutional jurisdictions, the granting of 
remedial grace periods is not simply the manifestation of judicial strat-
egy.  The argument unfolds in three main Parts.  Part I first compares the 
use of remedial grace periods in constitutional review under the civilian- 
continental and the common law models.  After drawing out the different 
paths toward unconstitutionality management in comparative constitu-
tional review, Part II conducts a functional analysis of remedial grace 
periods in the case law of the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC).  It 
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is observed that the three forms of remedial grace periods—bridging, 
nudging, and hedging—as indicated in the TCC case law are informed 
by the conceptual framework of graduated unconstitutionality borrowed 
from the civilian-continental model.  Part III further analyzes how reme-
dial grace periods have been instrumental to the TCC’s realization of its 
institutional potential.  In conclusion, the TCC’s continuing and frequent 
prescription for remedial grace periods indicates its default position 
in constitutional remedies, which is both informed by the civilian-con-
tinental model and shaped by its formative experience at the dawn of 
democratization.
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Introduction
Stories about Marbury v. Madison1 have been told time and again 
in constitutional scholarship.2  Obscured in its political twists and turns 
and the all too familiar end result—the accidental birth of modern con-
stitutional review3—is an arcane legal question: Did the Supreme Court 
have the authority to issue a writ of mandamus?4  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged the infringement of plaintiff William Marbury and his 
co-petitioners’ legal right but, it eventually denied them their sought con-
stitutional remedy that would bring them the withheld commissions for 
their appointments as justices of the peace.5  As suggested by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s framing of the legal issues, Marbury not only fathered 
modern constitutional review, but it also demonstrated the significance of 
the remedy question by linking constitutional review to the vindication 
of individual rights.6  Now, remedy is a distinct issue from the judgment 
as to the constitutional compatibility of the impugned state act7 in con-
stitutional review.
Since its announcement in 1803, Marbury has cast a long shadow 
over the practice of constitutional review and its remedy, especially in 
the common law jurisdictions.  The granting of a grace period for a state 
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See, e.g., Arguing Marbury v. Madison (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); Bruce 
Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the 
Rise of Presidential Democracy 163–98 (2005); Paul W. Kahn, The Reign of Law: 
Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America (1997).
3. See Maartje de Visser, Constitutional Review in Europe: A Comparative 
Perspective 94 (2014).  For a critical discussion of such characterization of Marbury v. 
Madison, see Mark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison around the world, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 
251 (2004).  In this Article, constitutional review refers to the review of the conformity 
of statutes (as well as other state acts) to the constitution by courts or other quasi- 
judicial but independent institutions such as the French Constitutional Council.  In 
this sense, constitutional review is a special type of judicial review.  For discussion of 
the pre–Marbury v. Madison traces of constitutional review in Europe, see Donald P. 
Kommers & Russell A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 4 (3d ed. 2012). Judicial review of statutes according to a stat-
utory bill of rights in Britain, New Zealand as well as part of Australia is not within 
the scope of the present Article.  For judicial review under a statutory bill of rights, see 
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: The-
ory and Practice (2013).  Cf. Robert Leckey, Bills of Rights in the Common Law 
(2015) (observing continuities and changes between the earlier review of provincial 
and colonial legislation and judicial review under the bill of rights in Canada, South 
Africa as well as Britain).
4. See Susan Low Bloch, Marbury Redux: A Comment on Suzanna Sherry, in 
Arguing Marbury v. Madison, supra note 2, at 60.
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173–80.
6. Id. at 154.  See also Bruce K. Miller & Neal E. Devins, Constitutional Rights 
without Remedies: Judicial Review of Underinclusive Legislation, 70 Judicature, no. 3, 
1986, at 151, 153–54.
7. For present purposes, a state act under constitutional review is that which is 
subject to judicial review for its constitutional conformity, or rather, constitutionality. 
It can result from the political branch, such as statutes, executive decisions, and admin-
istrative rules.  In this sense, a judicial ruling is a state act by the court.
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act found constitutionally invalid is considered a choice as to remedies 
in constitutional review.8  Seen in this light, granting a “remedial grace 
period”9 amounts to a legal technique to suspend or delay declaring an 
impugned state act constitutionally invalid, making a “suspension order” 
or a “suspended declaration of invalidity” a new addition to the constitu-
tional remedy toolkit.10  Thus, decisions such as Minister of Home Affairs 
v. Fourie from the South African Constitutional Court11 and w v. Reg-
istrar of Marriages from the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal12 have 
been labeled as “suspension orders with bite” in comparative studies of 
constitutional remedies.13  Besides prescribing a suspension order that 
delays the effect of an impugned state act being declared constitution-
ally invalid by attaching a grace period, those decisions further provide 
for the legal framework needed to redress constitutional injustice caused 
by the impugned legislation should the legislature fail to act at the grace 
period’s end.14  Taken as a whole, the granting of grace periods and suspen-
sion orders (with or without bite) are remedy choices aimed at delaying 
the voiding effect of finding an the impugned state act unconstitutional.
Paralleling the foregoing account mainly based on the common 
law jurisdictions, this Article aims to shed light on how variations on the 
management of unconstitutionality and changing constitutional politics 
effect the emergence of remedial grace periods as a permissible choice 
in constitutional review through a comparative study of the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court (TCC) (1949–2018).15  As will become clear, in con-
trast to judicial practices in other constitutional jurisdictions, remedial 
grace periods are more of a rule than an exception in Taiwan,16 and they 
8. e.g., Leckey, supra note 3, at 102–06, 137–44; Po Jen Yap, New Democracies 
and Novel Remedies, 2017 Pub. L. 30; Holning Lau, Comparative Perspectives on Stra-
tegic Remedial Delays, 91 Tul. L. Rev. 259 (2016); Eric S. Fish, Choosing Constitutional 
Remedies, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 322, 339–40, 360–62 (2016); Kent Roach, Constitution-
al, Remedial and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian experience, 40 
Tex. Intl. L.J. 537, 546–53 (2005); Kent Roach & Geoff Budlender, Mandatory Relief 
and Supervisory Jurisdiction: when Is It Appropriate, Just and equitable?, 122 S. Afr. 
L.J. 325, 334–35, 338–41 (2005).
9. Lau, supra note 8.
10. Yap, supra note 8.
11. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
12. W v. Registrar of Marriage, [2013] 16 H.K.C.F.A.R. 112.
13. Yap, supra note 8, at 37–39.
14. Id.
15. The argument submitted in this Article is based on the TCC case law in the 
period between 1949 and December 31, 2018 during which the TCC promulgated 773 
decisions (officially designated as Interpretations).  As of this writing, the TCC’s latest 
decision is Interpretation No. 774, which was issued on January 11, 2019.  The full-text 
Chinese version of all the TCC interpretations discussed in this Article is available at 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03.asp (Justices of the Constitutional 
Court, Judicial Yuan: Interpretations).  Full-text English translation (holding and rea-
soning only) of most of the TCC interpretations is available at http://www.judicial.gov.
tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03.asp.
16. See Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional 
Courts in Asian Cases 143 (2003).
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have evolved into the defining feature of the TCC’s case law.  This Arti-
cle argues that Taiwan’s unique remedial grace period jurisprudence is a 
function of both its received continental model of constitutional review 
(the German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) in particular), under 
which invalidity is distinguished from incompatibility to manage the 
implications of unconstitutionality, and the role of the TCC in Taiwan’s 
changing constitutional landscape.  Ultimately, the granting of remedial 
grace periods in Taiwan is the TCC’s default option when deciding on the 
constitutionality of the impugned state act rather than a strategic choice 
of remedy in individual cases.
Under the invalidity vs. incompatibility distinction, which will be 
further discussed, a judicial ruling that declares a state act incompatible 
with the constitution does not affect the legal effect of the impugned act, 
nor does it invalidate the impugned act.  With this distinction brought to 
the fore in comparative constitutional law, the subtle difference between 
the practice of judicial admonitions of incompatibility in the continen-
tal model of constitutional review17 and the remedial suspension orders 
as employed in the common law jurisdictions can be thrown into sharp 
relief.  As the case of Taiwan illustrates, the granting of remedial grace 
periods is not simply the manifestation of judicial strategy but rather a 
function of legal tradition and the calculated judicial choice in light of 
changing constitutional politics.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I compares the use of 
remedial grace periods in constitutional review under what I call the 
civilian-continental and the common law models.  Notably, constitutional 
review is traditionally classified by two types in scholarship—central-
ized and decentralized—with the former being conventionally associated 
with continental European countries, which share the civil law tradition, 
and the latter prevailing in the common law countries.18  To indicate the 
role legal tradition plays in the management of unconstitutionality,19 this 
Article instead adopts the terms the “civilian-continental model” and 
the “common law model” to denote the two conventional types of con-
stitutional review—centralized and decentralized— respectively in my 
ideal-type approach to comparative studies of remedial grace periods.20 
17. Judicial admonitions refer to “admonitory decisions” (Appellentschei-
dungen) in German constitutional jurisprudence.  See Wiltraut Rupp v. Brünneck, 
Germany: The Federal Constitutional Court, 20 Am. J. Comp. L. 387 (1972).  I shall fur-
ther address the substance of judicial admonitions when I discuss the TCC case law in 
Part II, infra.
18. For a classical discussion, see Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Com-
parative Perspective, 58 Calif. L. Rev. 1017 (1970).
19. Víctor Ferreres Comella notes the influence of the Civil Law tradition on 
the countries that adopt a centralized system of constitutional review.  Víctor Ferre-
res Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Per-
spective 20–24 (2009).
20. For the ideal-type approach to comparative law, see generally Mirjan R. 
Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority A Comparative Approach 
to the Legal Process (1991).  Needless to say, not all the civil law countries adopt 
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As will become clear, the granting of remedial grace periods in consti-
tutional review in the common law jurisdictions is considered a judicial 
remedial choice in response to the impugned state act’s invalidation.  In 
contrast, under the civilian-continental model, constitutional courts have 
granted grace periods to allow for a middle course between the lameness 
of declarations of incompatibility (vis-à-vis invalidity) and the sweeping 
invalidating effect of striking down unconstitutional state acts.
After distinguishing the paths in the civilian-continental and the 
common law jurisdictions, this Article continues with a comparative anal-
ysis, using a case study based on TCC case law.  Part II provides a tripartite 
typology following an overview of the use of remedial grace periods in 
Taiwan.  Remedial grace periods have been prescribed for three distinct 
functions—bridging, nudging, and hedging—each of which is centered 
on the distinction between incompatibility and invalidity in the civilian- 
continental model of constitutional review.  Part III explains why the 
TCC’s granting of remedial grace periods falls short of its deliberate stra-
tegic choice of constitutional remedies by tracking the development of 
remedial grace periods along the TCC’s evolving role in Taiwan’s chang-
ing political landscape.
Before proceeding, a terminological clarification is necessary.  A 
declaration of invalidity refers to a judgement of an unconstitutional 
state act (especially in the case of statutes) that results in the immedi-
ate invalidation of the impugned state act.  In this sense, a declaration of 
invalidity corresponds to the practical effects (vis-à-vis the logical con-
clusion) of a “declaration of nullity” (Nichtigkeitserklärung) in German 
constitutional jurisprudence.21  This Article adopts the more popular 
common law term, the declaration of invalidity, to include the declaration 
of nullity under the German and other civilian-continental model of con-
stitutional review.  The declaration of incompatibility, on the other hand, 
refers to a simple declaratory judgment of an unconstitutional state act 
centralized constitutional review as exemplified by the GFCC.  For example, Japan, 
some Latin American countries, and Nordic countries have modelled constitutional 
review after the U.S.-style decentralized judicial review.  See Ferreres Comella, supra 
note 19, at 4–5.  Notably, South Africa is a hybrid case.  On the one hand, as a legacy of 
its colonial past, South African legal system contains elements of the Roman-Dutch 
law and the English common law alongside its local customary law.  See Jens Meier-
henrich, The Legacies of Law: Long-Run Consequences of Legal Development 
in South Africa, 1652–2000, at 92–95 (2008).  On the other hand, it has installed a 
powerful constitutional court at the end of the Apartheid while other high courts are 
allowed to exercise constitutional review on some issues. S. Afr. Const., 1996.  When 
it comes to the compatibility of state acts with the constitutional bill of rights, South 
Africa has been studied along with other common law countries.  See, e.g., Leckey, 
supra note 3, at 48–51; Yap, supra note 8.
21. Gertrude Lübbe-Wolfe, The Constitutional Court’s Relationship to Parlia-
ment & Government, in Constitutional Justice: Functions and Relationship with 
the Other Public Authorities (National Report for the XVth Congress of the 
Conference of European Constitutional Courts) 1, 12 (2011); Reinhard Gaier, 
enforcement of the Constitutional Court’s Decisions, in Constitutional Justice at 36, 
39 (2011).
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to the effect that the impugned act is found incompatible or inconsistent 
with the constitution but is left unaltered in terms of enforceability.22
I. Remedial Grace Periods in Comparison: Two Approaches 
to Managing Unconstitutionality
In this Part, I first discuss the remedial grace periods in the civil-
ian-continental model of constitutional review, tracing its origin to 
the distinction between invalidity/nullity and incompatibility in con-
stitutional doctrine.  I suggest that instead of an innovation in judicial 
remedy, the granting of remedial grace periods, together with the doc-
trinal invalidity-incompatibility distinction, is part of the constitutional 
court’s endeavors to reconceive of the concept of unconstitutionality 
and thus manage its consequences.  Next, I discuss whether and, if so, to 
what extent the granting of grace periods in constitutional review in the 
common law jurisdictions is new in terms of their traditional equitable 
approach to judicial remedy.
A. Toward Graduated Unconstitutionality: The Civilian- 
Continental Model
The GFCC has established itself as the exemplar of the civilian-con-
tinental model of constitutional review since its inauguration in 1951 
when the nascent Federal Republic was only beginning to take shape as a 
constitutional democracy.23  It takes pride in its role as the guardian of the 
constitution and the protector of fundamental rights for which the GFCC 
is regarded as “the model to emulate.”24  Although the procedure for con-
stitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) has been installed since 
its early days, the framers of the Basic Law, inspired by the experience 
of the Austrian Constitutional Court of the 1920s (ACC),25 were mainly 
concerned with guarding the abstract constitutionality of state acts (espe-
cially statutes) when they conceived of the institution of constitutional 
review.26  The early focus on the compatibility (or consistency) of state 
acts with the constitution in the institutional design of the GFCC sheds 
illuminating light on the granting of grace periods under the civilian-con-
tinental model of constitutional review.
22. Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) may be the most noted ex-
ample of the declaration of incompatibility (vis-à-vis invalidity) in judicial review, al-
though it is not in the constitutional context as defined in this Article.  See Gardbaum, 
supra note 3, at 29–30.  In Germany, the functional equivalent is the declaration of the 
condemned state act as “simply incompatible (unvereinbar)” instead of “null and void 
(nichtig).”  See Kommers & Miller, supra note 3, at 35–36.
23. Justin Collings, Democracy’s Guardians: A History of the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court 1951–2001, at xxviii–xlii (2015).
24. de Visser, supra note 3, at 62.
25. See Klaus von Beyme, America as a Model: The Impact of American De-
mocracy in the World 94–95 (1987).
26. Kommers & Miller, supra note 3, at 8–9, 12.
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Conceived in Hans Kelsen’s image of the Stufenbau of the legal 
system, the ACC, the prototype of the civilian-continental model of 
constitutional review, was created to guarantee the integrity of the hier-
archical legal system with the constitution sitting atop it.27  According to 
Kelsen’s pure theory of law, as the legal authority of a regulation under 
that hierarchical system derives from the law at higher level, a statute 
that deviates from the authorization of the legal rule above it, i.e., the 
constitution, should be devoid of legality.  Allowing an unconstitutional 
statute, which has no legal authority, to remain in force would be con-
tradictory to the very idea of the legal system as a hierarchical structure 
(Stufenbau).  Thus, to Kelsen, constitutional review is more than an insti-
tutional choice.  Instead, it is a conclusion necessitated by the hierarchical 
order of the legal system.  As Kelsen’s brainchild, the ACC functioned 
as a “negative legislator” tasked to guard the integrity of the Austrian 
constitutional system against internal contradiction resulting from unau-
thorized legal rules, especially unconstitutional statutes, even though no 
personal interest or individual right would be actually affected because 
of an unconstitutional statute.28
Through this lens, as a rule, an unconstitutional statute is naturally 
null and void at its enactment as it never acquires legality because of its 
unconstitutionality.29  Correspondingly, the finding of unconstitutionality 
of the impugned statute by constitutional review must be declaratory in 
nature as it is essentially an authoritative restatement of its state of uncon-
stitutionality that originated at the enactment of the impugned statute.30 
Once such an authoritative judgment is promulgated, the impugned 
statute is considered invalid since its enactment.  Viewed this way, a dec-
laration of unconstitutionality would result in the ex tunc invalidation of 
the impugned state act.31  Nullity is not a chosen remedy in response to an 
unconstitutional state act but rather, the only logical conclusion dictated 
by the finding of its unconstitutionality.32  Unconstitutionality (Ver-
fassungswidrigkeit) is synonymous with nullity (Nichtigkeit) or invalidity.
Problems with such a conceptual approach to the constitutional 
control of state acts arose quickly when the GFCC was still in incubation. 
One of the most pressing issues concerned the impact of a declaration of 
nullity/invalidity on the stability and certainty of the legal order.33  For 
27. F. Rubio Llorente, Constitutional Jurisdiction as Law-Making, in Law in the 
Making: A Comparative Survey 156, 165–66 (Alessandro Pizzorusso ed., 1988).
28. Id. at 166.
29. de Visser, supra note 3, at 317.  It is noteworthy that Kelsen himself softened 
the link between unconstitutionality and voidness for reasons of legal certainty by 
replacing the latter with the concept of “voidability.”  Llorente, supra note 27, at 167. 
In this way, the effects of the ACC’s judgements of unconstitutionality have been pro-
spective in principle since its inception.  Id.; Ferreres Comella, supra note 19 at 25, 
176 n. 25.
30. Llorente, supra note 27, at 167.
31. de Visser, supra note 3, at 317.
32. Id. at 312, 320.
33. Wiltraut Rupp v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 390–91.
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example, a judicial decision based on a statute that was later declared 
unconstitutional and thus invalid would be annulled because conceptu-
ally it was regarded as legally groundless despite res judicata.34  Moreover, 
with constitutional review extending to state acts regarding the protec-
tion of fundamental rights, a declaration of unconstitutionality could do 
more harm than good to the claimant, especially when the impugned 
statute conferred beneficial entitlements or equal treatment.  Nota-
bly, such drastic effects were not the result of unwise choices in judicial 
remedy but the logical conclusion drawn from the conceptual framework 
informing the GFCC and other civil law jurisdictions of constitutional 
review.35To mitigate the severe effects of declarations of unconstitutional-
ity, the GFCC and its designers have taken pains to reshape the foregoing 
conceptual framework through constitutional jurisprudence as well as 
legislation, pointing in the direction of graduated unconstitutionality.  On 
the one hand, the GFCC designers managed to restrict the retroactive 
effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality while continuing to main-
tain the rule that a declaration of unconstitutionality would lead to the 
ex tunc invalidation of the impugned state act.36  Interestingly, though 
the effects of invalidating unconstitutional state acts have been mostly ex 
nunc in practice, such practices are still considered to be ad hoc instances 
of pragmatic measures that do not displace the rule of ex tunc invalida-
tion.37  On the other hand, the GFCC gradually separated the decision on 
legal effects from the judgment of unconstitutionality by declaring the 
impugned state act “incompatible” (unvereinbar) with the constitution or 
simply unconstitutional without ordering it to be invalid/void (nichtig).38 
As a result, unconstitutionality, incompatibility, and invalidity were no 
longer synonyms.  Only a declaration of unconstitutionality buttressed 
with an order of invalidity would lead to the annulment of the impugned 
state act.  In contrast, a state act found incompatible with the constitution 
only would remain in force since it was not legally invalidated.39  With 
unconstitutionality understood as a graduated state rather than a unitary 
concept, the doctrinal distinction between invalidity and incompatibility 
34. de Visser, supra note 3, at 317.
35. Id. at 320.
36. Wiltraut Rupp v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 391; Wolfgang Zeidler, Federal 
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany: Decisions on the Constitu-
tionality of Legal Norms, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 504, 518 (1987).
37. Compare de Visser, supra note 3, at 317, with Llorente, supra note 27, at 167.
38. Kommers & Miller, supra note 3, at 35–36; de Visser, supra note 3, at 320–
24; Rupp v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 398; Llorente, supra note 27, at 173–74, 178; 
Zeidler, supra note 36, at 516–18.
39. The conventional wisdom holds that German state authorities should and 
actually have exercised prudence in the continuing enforcement of the state act found 
incompatible with the constitution, regardless of whether the GFCC prescribed a 
grace period at all.  Zeidler, supra note 36, at 519.  Yet, the German experience should 
not be taken for granted in light of the mixed record of other jurisdictions that sub-
scribe to the distinction between declarations of invalidity and incompatibility.  See de 
Visser, supra note 3, at 320–24.
166 Vol. 36:157PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL
emerged, providing the GFCC with the conceptual tool needed to miti-
gate the legal effects of finding a state act unconstitutional.
Yet, that new conceptual framework soon raised further issues 
about the legal effects of the GFCC’s negative decisions on the consti-
tutionality of the impugned state act.  What would happen to such an 
unconstitutional but not invalid act?  Could the administration continue 
to enforce a statute that was declared incompatible with the constitu-
tion?  Would such a declaration of incompatibility implicate any legal 
obligation to rectify to the administration or the parliament?  What if 
the administration and the parliament failed to act?  In response to these 
questions resulting from the distinction between invalidity and incom-
patibility, the GFCC jurisprudence drew inspiration from the Austrian 
experience and embraced the legal technique of granting grace periods 
for state acts found incompatible with the constitution.40
Granted, grace periods have been only a part of the GFCC’s robust 
strategy of self-enforcement in response to state acts found incompat-
ible with the constitution without being invalidated.41  Nevertheless, 
the variations on the granting of grace periods themselves, which are 
of particular pertinence to my present purposes, merit close examina-
tion.  In some cases, the GFCC has prescribed that the impugned state 
act be amended within a fixed period of time or by a definite deadline 
apart from declaring it incompatible with the constitution.  For example, 
in a case concerning the inheritance tax, the GFCC stipulated that the 
impugned statutory provision be further applied “‘until a new provision’ 
and set a deadline for this new provision of 31 December 2008 at the lat-
est.”42  In other cases, the GFCC has instead ordered that the impugned 
state act continue to be valid until a set date along with a declaration of 
incompatibility.  For example, in a case regarding the constitutionality of 
the property tax statute, the GFCC ordered that the impugned statute 
“continue to apply until 31 December 1996 ‘at most.’”43
It is noteworthy that the above two types of grace periods make no 
practical difference in Germany since the parliament and the administra-
tion as well as other public authorities have been faithfully responsive to 
the GFCC’s calls for rectification virtually without exception.44  Yet, they 
40. Wiltraut Rupp v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 395.
41. The GFCC Act §35 reads, “The Federal Constitutional Court may specify 
in its decision who is to execute it; in individual cases it may also specify the method 
of execution.”  Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court Act], August 11, 1993, BGBl I at 1473, last amended by Article 2 of the Act, 
October 8, 2017, BGBl I at 3546 (Ger.), http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Gesetze/BVerfGG.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5. 
See  Lübbe-Wolfe, supra note 21, at 12–15; Gaier, supra note 21, at 38–43; see also 
Kommers & Miller, supra note 3, at 36; Wiltraut Rupp v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 
391–95; Llorente, supra note 27, at 173–74; Zeidler, supra note 36, at 516–18.
42. Gaier, supra note 21, at 43 (discussing BVerfGE 117, 1).
43. Id. (discussing BVerfGE 93, 121).
44. Compare id. at 42–43, with Zeidler, supra note 36, at 519.  For rare instances 
of public defiance on the GFCC, see Collings, supra note 23, at 260–74.
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are distinct in legal terms.  In the first type as the inheritance tax case 
illustrated, grace periods were mainly aimed to urge the parliament or 
the administration to take rectificatory actions; in the second, grace peri-
ods were granted to avoid immediate invalidation in situations like the 
property tax case.  Thus, in terms of legal effects, a fundamental distinc-
tion needs to be drawn between the orders of granting grace periods as 
discussed above.  In the first case, had the parliament failed to amend the 
impugned inheritance tax statutory provision by the deadline of Decem-
ber 31, 2008, that provision would have continued to apply as it was only 
declared incompatible rather than invalid and remained in force.45  In 
contrast, in the second case, had the impugned property tax statute not 
been rectified by December 31, 1996, the impugned statute would have 
lapsed after the expiration of the deadline as the GFCC had sunset its 
validity along with the declaration of incompatibility.46  Although both 
cases are examples of declarations of incompatibility accompanied by 
grace periods, their legal effects are different.  While the judgment in the 
second case amounted to a suspended declaration of invalidity as it actu-
ally rendered the validity of the impugned statute timebound, the first 
judgment was merely a declaration of incompatibility since the elapse of 
the court-prescribed grace period would have no direct legal effects on 
the impugned statutory provision.47  The doctrinal distinction between 
incompatibility and invalidity informs the differentiated legal effects of 
the GFCC’s granting of grace periods.
In sum, how to mitigate the drastic legal effects of a state act being 
declared unconstitutional, i.e., the ex tunc invalidation, is a central con-
cern to German constitutional framers.  Since such effects are considered 
the logical conclusion drawn from the traditional conceptual approach 
to constitutional interpretation, the solution begins with the concep-
tual distinction between invalidity and incompatibility in doctrine.  Once 
that distinction is recognized, a concept of graduated unconstitution-
ality develops, enabling the GFCC to work adroitly around the issues 
surrounding the unconstitutionality of a state act.  With grace periods, 
the GFCC has further saved itself from the hard choice between the 
lameness of declarations of incompatibility and the drastic effect of dec-
larations of invalidity.  Seen in this light, granting grace periods is more 
part of the efforts to address the practical issues resulting from the doc-
trinal distinction between incompatibility and invalidity than a legal 
technique in judicial remedy.  The incompatibility/invalidity distinction 
holds the key to understanding the granting of grace periods under the 
45. Gaier, supra note 21, at 43.
46. Id.
47. The GFCC has been increasingly assertive when making a declaration of 
incompatibility.  Apart from turning it into a suspended declaration of invalidity by 
setting a deadline for the validity of the impugned state act, it has added more and 
more specific instructions as to the anticipated statutory reform or imposed interim 
measures on its own.  For further discussion, see id. at 38–43.
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civilian-continental model of constitutional review,48 including constitu-
tional review in Taiwan.
B. “New” Choices in Judicial Remedy?  The Common Law Model
Although Marbury v. Madison of the United States has long been 
considered the origin of modern judicial review, there is no consensus as 
to whether the introduction of constitutional review in other common law 
jurisdictions is a continuity or a break with their shared legal tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty.49  Yet, despite the debate over the newness of 
the recent adoption of (quasi) constitutional review in Canada and South 
Africa and other common law jurisdictions, scholars agree on the nov-
elty of granting grace periods in judicial declarations of (constitutional) 
invalidity as to state acts.50  But how novel is it?  Is it novel only in the 
common law world?  Is it distinctive in the broader landscape of compar-
ative constitutional law?
In contrast to the civilian-continental model of constitutional 
review aimed at the abstract constitutional control of state acts as dis-
cussed above, constitutional review developed out of the traditional 
judicial function in the common law world.51  Corresponding to its tra-
ditional common law review, remedy choice in constitutional review in 
the common law jurisdictions is an issue distinct from the validity of the 
impugned state act.52  The dual structure of validity judgment and remedy 
in constitutional adjudication holds the key to making sense of how novel 
a suspended declaration of invalidity is.
As Chief Justice Marshall emphasized in Marbury v. Madison, con-
sidering that the constitution is “the fundamental and paramount law,”53 
“an act of the [l]egislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.”54  A 
state act that is incompatible with the constitution is thus “unconstitu-
tional and void.”55  The link between constitutional incompatibility and 
legal voidness has cast a long shadow on the common law approach to 
constitutional review.  Finding an impugned state act incompatible with 
the constitution leads to its invalidation in the common law jurisdictions 
where constitutional review has recently been installed.  For example, 
48. See de Visser, supra note 3, at 317–24.
49. Compare Gardbaum, supra note 3, with Leckey, supra note 3.  See also 
Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare 
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (2008).
50. See Leckey, supra note 3, at 102–03; Yap, supra note 8; Roach, supra note 8, 
at 546.
51. de Visser, supra note 3, at 94; Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Background 
of Marbury v. Madison, in Arguing Marbury v. Madison, supra note 2, at 47, 52–53; see 
also Leckey, supra note 3, at 56–63.
52. See Fish, supra note 8, at 330; see also Miller & Devins, supra note 6, at 153.
53. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
54. Id.
55. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 436 (1819).
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in Canada, the legal basis of making judicial declarations of invalidity is 
attributed to the provision of constitutional supremacy.56
On its face, this seems to reflect the conceptual approach to the 
unconstitutionality of state acts in the civilian-continental model as dis-
cussed above.  On closer examination, however, the distinctiveness of 
the common law model becomes clear.  First, though Marbury declares 
that “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void,”57 
it does not suggest a real concept of statutes void ab initio.  Rather, the 
impugned state act is valid until held unconstitutional in specific cases. 
Paralleling the precedential, i.e., forward-looking effect of the hold-
ing of unconstitutionality, prior actions (especially already adjudicated 
ones) that were taken on the basis of the impugned state act would not 
be affected as a result of a declaration of unconstitutionality.58  This lim-
ited effect of unconstitutionality distinguishes the common law tradition 
from the prototype of the civilian-continental model under which a dec-
laration of unconstitutionality would lead logically to the impugned state 
act’s ex tunc invalidation.59
Second, under the common law model of constitutional review, a 
declaration of invalidity actually plays a double role: a declaration of 
invalidity is not only (A) a judgment as to the (un)constitutionality of 
the impugned state act but also (B) a remedy in response to the uncon-
stitutional state act.  To put it differently, a declaration of invalidity is 
essentially a judicial order that is issued to remedy an impugned state 
act that is declared unconstitutional (A), with (B) the measure of inval-
idation or nullification.  Moreover, as invalidation has been habitually 
chosen as the judicial remedy in cases concerning the nonconstitutional 
judicial review of the compatibility of subordinate legislation with a 
parental statute,60 the dual character of declarations of invalidity has thus 
been eclipsed.  Yet, when the supposed invalidation effect that results 
from an impugned state act found unconstitutional in a declaration of 
invalidity becomes problematic, the foregoing dual character of the 
declaration of invalidity has resurfaced in the differentiating responses 
in constitutional decisions.  While a judgment of the unconstitutional-
ity of the constitution still results in a judicial declaration of invalidity 
56. Constitution Act, 1982, s 52, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 
(U.K.), provides “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any 
law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, of no force or effect.”  See also Leckey, supra note 3, at 103; Roach, supra 
note 8, at 546; Sarah Burningham, A Comment on the Court’s Decision to Suspend the 
Declaration of Invalidity in Carter v. Canada, 78 Sask. L. Rev. 201, 201 (2015).
57. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
58. I am indebted to Mark Tushnet for a detailed comment on the distinctive-
ness of the Common Law model of constitutional review, especially in the United 
States.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28–36.
60. Such practices, which had long existed in the several Common Law coun-
tries, are considered the source of inspiration for their formal adoption of constitu-
tional review.  See Leckey, supra note 3, at 56–63.
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(or nullity), the legal effects of such a declaration become a question of 
remedy choice to be addressed separately.  In this light, the emphasis 
seems to be shifting from the equation of unconstitutionality with invalid-
ity in the judgment of the impugned state act’s constitutional conformity 
(A) to the consideration as to whether a declaration of invalidity is the 
best judicial remedy for unconstitutionality in individual cases (B).61
As noted above, constitutional review in the common law tradi-
tion is concrete and is centered around individual cases with emphasis 
on the vindication of individual rights.62  Seen in this light, contextual-
ized responses (including suspension orders) are not foreign to judicial 
remedy for the constitutional invalidity of the impugned state act.63 
Thanks to the equitable and discretionary character of the law of judicial 
remedy in the common law tradition,64 responses to the legal effects of 
declarations of invalidity in constitutional review have been characterized 
by judicial creativity.  Combined with other remedial measures, declara-
tions of invalidity have adopted unconventional and complex forms.  The 
granting of a remedial grace period is merely a technical choice among 
the various skills of judicial remedy in response to the invalidity of the 
impugned state act.65  With a remedial grace period granted, the effects 
of the declaration of invalidity are suspended, leaving the enforceability 
of the impugned state act unaltered during the grace period.  The grant-
ing of remedial grace periods in constitutional review in the common law 
jurisdictions gives rise to the remedial form of suspended declarations 
of invalidity.
With the dual character of declarations of invalidity disclosed, 
answers to the questions put forward earlier also become clear.  The 
legal effect of granting a grace period to a declaration of invalidity—the 
suspension of the declaration of invalidity—is novel as it results in the 
situation of unconstitutional state acts remaining in force in jurisdictions 
rooted in the common law tradition.  Yet, situated in the common law 
tradition of discretionary and equitable judicial remedy, remedial grace 
periods can be seen as a contextualized remedy choice.  From this per-
spective, the granting of remedial grace periods is not as unconventional 
as it appears.
To sum up, under the common law tradition that remedy choice 
stands apart from the judgment of (in)validity/(un)constitutionality, 
the granting of remedial grace periods has been virtually absorbed into 
the question of judicial remedy with the dual character of declarations 
of invalidity obscured.  Drawing heavily on the recent experience of 
61. Id. at 115–22; Yap, supra note 8, at 30; Roach & Budlender, supra note 8, at 
326–27; Burningham, supra note 56, at 202; see also Tushnet, supra note 49, at 247–50.
62. de Visser, supra note 3, at 97; Tushnet, supra note 49, at 247.
63. But cf. Fish, supra note 8, at 347–73; Tushnet, supra note 49, at 247.
64. Fish, supra note 8, at 329–33; Roach & Budlender, supra note 8, at 325–27 & 
n.6.
65. See Roach & Budlender, supra note 8, at 326–27, 328–33, 337–45; Tushnet, 
supra note 49, at 248–49; see also Fish, supra note 8, at 333–47.
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constitutional review in the common law jurisdictions, current literature 
tends to characterize it as a novel judicial remedy choice in the form of 
the suspension order as to the declaration of invalidity.66  Framed this way, 
the granting of remedial grace periods is tied to declarations of invalidity, 
regardless of whether it is prescribed in a suspension order simpliciter or 
in its augmented edition, i.e., a suspension order with bite.  As a result, the 
potential functions of grace periods in constitutional review beyond sus-
pending declarations of invalidity are not given due attention.
Before proceeding to the case study, it will help to reflect on the 
use of remedial grace periods in constitutional review by juxtaposing 
the common law model with its civilian-continental counterpart.  It is 
true that remedial grace periods emerge in the judicial management of 
the consequences of unconstitutional state acts in both models of consti-
tutional review.  Nevertheless, juxtaposed with the common law model, 
the civilian-continental model shows that the granting of remedial grace 
periods does not necessarily give rise to the state of suspended declara-
tions of invalidity.  This suggests the wider role of remedial grace periods 
in the management of unconstitutionality than has been contended in the 
existing common law model-based scholarship.  In the following, Taiwan 
is to be closely studied to shed light on why the full potential of reme-
dial grace periods can only be appreciated by taking account of legal 
tradition and the political landscape in which a constitutional jurisdiction 
is situated.
II. Remedial Grace Periods in the TCC Case Law:  
A Functional Analysis
Deferring the question of why the TCC has turned to remedial 
grace periods to Part III, this Part presents an observation of the TCC’s 
granting of remedial grace periods in practice to illustrate the manifold 
functions of remedial grace periods.  In the first place, I offer an over-
view of the use of remedial grace periods in the TCC case law.  Besides 
indicating the TCC’s growing trend toward remedial grace periods in 
its unconstitutionality judgments, I shall point out that not all the TCC 
judgements attached with a remedial grace period can be classified as sus-
pension orders.  Instead, they need to be further differentiated in terms 
of the distinction between incompatibility and invalidity.  Following the 
overview, I provide a tripartite typology of the TCC judgements accom-
panied by a remedial grace period in terms of the function of granting 
grace periods in the TCC constitutional jurisprudence.
A. More Than Suspension Orders: An Overview of the TCC’s  
Use of Remedial Grace Periods
In its seventy years of existence, the TCC has issued 774 inter-
pretations.67  Since the TCC’s first use of a remedial grace period in 
66. For general commentary, see the sources cited in note 8, supra.
67. The TCC’s rulings are formally designated as “J.Y. Interpretations.”  For 
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Interpretation No. 218 issued in 1987,68 the TCC has granted remedial grace 
periods 86 times in total.69  All of them were attached to unconstitution-
ality judgments concerning the political branch’s acts, including statutes 
and administrative rules.  The proportion of the interpretations attached 
purposes of elegance and simplicity, this Article substitutes Interpretations for J.Y. 
Interpretations.  The TCC was inaugurated in 1948.  Statistics concerning the TCC 
case law referred to infra are based on the case law as of December 31, 2018.  For the 
explanation, see supra note 15.  Until the end of the Fourth Council of Grand Justices 
of the Judicial Yuan in September 1985, only 199 interpretations were promulgated. 
A terminological note is due.  The Judicial Yuan is the umbrella governing body of 
judicial administration, which is one of the five highest constitutional powers under 
Taiwan’s quintpartite separation of powers system.  The Judicial Yuan exercises consti-
tutional review in the form of the Council of Grand Justices, which is popularly known 
as the TCC.  The Council of Grand Justices is set to be replaced by the Constitutional 
Tribunal when the new Constitutional Litigation Act comes into effect on January 3, 
2022.  See also Tzu-Yi Lin et al., Seventy Years On: The Taiwan Constitutional Court 
and Judicial Activism in a Changing Constitutional Landscape, 48 H.K. L.J. 995, 1023 
& n.140 (2018).  For an introduction to the current judicial organization in Taiwan, see 
generally Wen-Chen Chang, Courts and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: Gradual Transfor-
mations Towards the Guardian of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in Asian Courts 
in Context 143, 145–51 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2014).
68. In Interpretation No. 217, which was issued just two days after martial law 
being formally lifted on July 15, 1987, the TCC upheld an interpretive circular issued 
by the Ministry of Finance.  I further discuss the significance of Interpretation No. 218 
in Part III, infra.
69. Interpretation Nos. 261, 282, 599, and 631 are excluded for the following 
reasons.  As regards Interpretation Nos. 261 and 282, some scholars include both in the 
studies of “judicial deadline.”  See, e.g., Yeh Jiunn-rong (葉俊榮), Minzhu Zhuanxing 
yu Xianfa Bianqian (民主轉型與憲法變遷) (Democratic Transition and Constitu-
tional Change] 323–89 (2003); Wen-Chen Chang et al., Constitutionalism in Asia: 
Cases and Materials 455 (2014).  I exclude them in the discussion of remedial grace 
periods as it is questionable whether the deadlines set in those two interpretations are 
remedial in character.  Interpretation No. 261 (1990) ordered the members of the First 
Parliament Legislative Yuan elected in 1947 and 1948 to vacate their parliamentary 
seats by December 31, 1991 and thereby resolved the foremost political issue in Tai-
wan’s democratization.  See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1011.  Given that the very long 
First Parliament was also ordered to close in December 1992, the deadline imposed 
in Interpretation No. 261 was more of part of the TCC’s constitutional disapproval of 
those parliamentarians serving for decades on end since the elections of 1947 and 1948 
than a remedial grace period.  As regards Interpretation No. 282 (1991), it is essentially 
the postponement of Interpretation No. 282 itself instead of a remedial grace period 
corresponding to a judgment of unconstitutionality.  With respect to Interpretation 
No. 599 (2005), a preliminary junction decision in relation to Interpretation No. 603 
(2005), it is an instance of what Neal Katyal calls “judicial sunset.”  See Neal Katyal, 
Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1237, 1244–47 (2004).  It is also 
noteworthy that Interpretation No. 631 (2007) seems to prescribe a remedial grace 
period in correspondence to the effective date of the prospective legislative amend-
ment to the Communications Privacy Act, the repealed provision of which was de-
clared invalid by the TCC.  Given that the impugned statutory provision had already 
been amended, Interpretation No. 631 was only rendered so that the petitioner could 
request retrial on the decision.  Thus, the grace period was not remedial but to be syn-
chronized with the legislatively designated effective date of the statutory amendment. 
Taken as a whole, Interpretation No. 631 amounts to the TCC’s endorsement of the 
statutory amendment.  For these reasons, I exclude Interpretation No. 631 as well.
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with a remedial grace period to the entire TCC case law is inconspicuous 
but deceptive, falling far short of reflecting its role in the TCC approach 
to constitutional review in practice.  Thus, as will be further discussed in 
Part III, the better foil for the role of remedial grace periods in the TCC 
jurisprudence is the TCC’s interpretations issued after its formative stage 
(1948–85) when the influential Fifth Council of Grand Justices (of the 
Judicial Yuan) (hereinafter the Fifth Council) assumed office in October 
1985.70  Since then, the TCC has issued 574 interpretations, approximately 
15 percent of which included a remedial grace period.  As a remedial grace 
period must be prescribed to redress the unconstitutionality judgment as 
to state acts, the percentage substantially changes when compared to the 
TCC’s unconstitutionality judgments in its post-formative stage: 39 per-
cent (86/223).  Moreover, when we exclude those judgements concerning 
advisory opinion referrals and unconstitutional judicial precedents (or 
interpretations) and focus on the TCC’s judgments as to the constitu-
tionality of the political branch’s acts,71 the real face of the TCC’s use 
of remedial grace periods is unveiled.  Among the 191 judgements that 
declare the invalidity or incompatibility of the political branch’s acts, 86 
(45 percent) are attached with a remedial grace period.72
As noted above, the TCC first included a remedial grace period in 
Interpretation No. 218 in the early years of the Fifth Council.  During 
that term (October 1985–September 1994), the TCC issued 167 interpre-
tations in total, 28 of which were unconstitutionality judgments on the 
political branch’s acts that included a remedial grace period.73  During 
the Sixth Council (October 1994–September 2003), the TCC issued 65 
unconstitutionality judgments on the political branch’s acts that included 
70. For the relationship between the Council of Grand Justices and the TCC, 
see supra note 67.
71. Apart from constitutional interpretations, the TCC has jurisdiction over 
“unification interpretation.”  For the distinction between constitutional and unifica-
tion interpretation in the TCC’s jurisdictions, see Jau-Yuan Hwang et al., “The Clouds 
Are Gathering”: Developments in Taiwanese Constitutional Law—The Year 2016 in 
Review, 15 Int’l J. Const. L. 753, 755–56 (2017).  For the present purposes, I exclude 
unification interpretations from my discussion of the TCC’s approach to constitution-
al remedies.
72. Interpretation No. 535 (2001) is ambiguous.  The TCC was ambivalent on 
the constitutionality of the impugned Policing Act as the TCC seemed to suggest that 
the impugned statute was barely constitutional only when several provisions of the 
impugned statute were read down.  Even so, the TCC prescribed a remedial grace 
period of two years and admonished the political branch to amend the Policing Act, 
though the TCC fell short of declaring it incompatible with the constitution.  Strictly 
speaking, Interpretation No. 535 was an “admonitory decision” (Appellentscheidung) 
proper rather than a declaration of incompatibility, at least in form.  Thus, I include 
Interpretation No. 535 in my count of the TCC interpretations that make declarations 
of invalidity or incompatibility with a remedial grace period prescribed.
73. Interpretation Nos. 200–366 were issued during the Fifth Council.  See 
also Judicial Yuan, Appendix, in Leading Cases of the Taiwan Constitutional 
Court, Volume One 203, 313 (2018), available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/judlib/ 
EBookQry04.asp?S=X&scode=X&seq=2.
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a remedial grace period among the 200 interpretations issued.74  With 
the Sixth Council replaced by the Grand Justices appointed to stag-
gered terms of eight years,75 however, the use of remedial grace periods 
has soared.  From October 2003 on, over 56 percent (55/98) of uncon-
stitutionality judgments on the political branch’s acts have included a 
remedial grace period.76
Table 1
(1)
Period
(2)
Total 
 Interpretations
(3)
Cases Declared 
 Unconstitutional
(4)
Cases 
 Prescribed 
With a Grace 
Period
(5)
Percentage 
(6)
[(5) ÷ (4)]
5th Council 10.01.1985– 
09.30.1994
167 28 9 32%
6th Council 10.01.1994– 
09.30.2003
200 65 22 34%
Yueh-sheng 
Weng Court
10.01.2003– 
09.30.2007
67 26 8 33%
In-jaw Lai 
Court
10.01.2007– 
10.01.2010
48 25 17 68%
Hau-min Rai 
Court
10.13.2010– 
10.31.2016
59 31 19 61%
Tzong-li Hsu 
Court
11.01.2016– 
12.31.2018
33 16 11 69%
Notes: From October 1, 2003 on, Grand Justices have been appointed to staggered terms of eight years 
(except half of those who were appointed in 2003 for a four-year term, including President-Grand Jus-
tice Yueh-Sheng Weng).
‘Cases’ in (4) and (5) columns only include the state acts of the political branch, namely, statutes and 
administrative rules.
Moreover, as indicated in Table 1, the recent rise of the TCC’s use of 
remedial grace periods has more to do with personnel composition than 
the change on the terms of Grand Justices.  2007 was the year when Presi-
dent-Grand Justice Yueh-Sheng WENG (翁岳生), the last holdover from 
the Fifth Council, during the term of which remedial grace periods were 
initially adopted, retired from the TCC.  Before he left the TCC, remedial 
grace periods appeared 39 times over a span of twenty-two years.  Since 
President-Grand Justice Weng’s retirement in 2007, the TCC has issued 
another 47 interpretations attached with a remedial grace period just for 
over a decade.
Apart from the recent increasing use of remedial grace periods, the 
TCC case law suggests that a declaration of unconstitutionality attached 
with a remedial grace period does not necessarily point in the direction 
of “suspension orders” that delay the invalidation of the impugned state 
74. Interpretation Nos. 367–566 were issued during the Sixth Council.  See also 
Judicial Yuan, supra note 73.
75. Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Constitution of Taiwan: A Contextual Analysis 
160 (2016).
76. The first interpretation issued by the TCC staffed with Grand Justices ap-
pointed to staggered terms is Interpretation No. 567 (2003).
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act.77  As the foregoing discussion of the civilian-continental model shows, 
while remedial grace periods are prescribed in declarations of incom-
patibility (vis-à-vis invalidity), their legal effects depend on the varying 
judicial orders.  In contrast, the TCC has further prescribed remedial grace 
periods in declarations of invalidity.  Even so, informed by the GFCC 
doctrinal distinction between incompatibility and invalidity under the 
concept of unconstitutionality, the TCC carefully distinguished between 
declarations of incompatibility and those of invalidity in its interpreta-
tions where a grace period was granted.78  Should the impugned state act 
remain unchanged after the prescribed grace period elapses, a declaration 
of incompatibility attached with such a grace period will not affect that 
state act’s legal effects.  In other words, a remedial grace period does not 
suspend or delay the TCC’s declaration of incompatibility as such a dec-
laration does not affect the legal validity of the impugned state act.  Thus, 
not all of the 86 interpretations where a remedial grace period is granted 
are suspended declarations of invalidity.  Specifically, while 70 interpre-
tations are suspended declarations of invalidity, others are declarations 
or admonitions of incompatibility attached with a remedial grace period 
having different legal implications, to which I shall shortly turn next.
Before proceeding, a methodological and definitional note is due. 
In contrast to the GFCC, the TCC has followed a much gentler approach 
when it condemns the impugned state act’s unconstitutionality, regard-
less of whether the condemned act was invalidated or not.79  As a result, 
it requires discerning the code phrases chosen by the TCC to communi-
cate the judgment of incompatibility, including “not entirely compatible” 
(未盡相符) and “compatible with the constitution only if .  .  . ” ( .  .  . 始
與憲法相符), and that of invalidity, including “invalid” (失其效力) and 
“inoperative” (停止適用).80  For this reason, some of the TCC’s declara-
tions of incompatibility are hardly distinguishable from its “admonitory 
decisions” (Appellentscheidungen), which in German law are considered 
to be holding the impugned state acts constitutional albeit with warn-
ings about the defects that need to be rectified to avoid constitutional 
condemnation in the future.81  Given the seeming extension of admon-
itory decisions to those declaring the impugned state act incompatible 
77. Yap, supra note 8.  For the impact of the recent Interpretations Nos. 725 and 
741 on the judicial enforceability of the law that was declared invalid with a remedial 
grace period attached, see Chang et al., supra note 69, at 761.
78. Weng Yueh-Sheng (翁岳生), Xianfa zhi weihuzhe: Xingsi yu Qixu (憲法
之維護者—省思與期許) [Guardian of Constitution: Reflection and expectation], in 
Xianfa zhi Lilun yu Shiwu (di Liu Ji) (Shang Ce) (憲法解釋之理論與實務 (第六輯) 
(上冊) [Constitutional Interpretations: Theory and Practice, Vol. VI (Part I)] 1, 
31 n. 94 (Fort Fu-Te Liao (廖福特) ed., 2009), available at http://publication.iias.sinica.
edu.tw/book/book08/book08ch01-1.
79. I shall further discuss this legacy from its early case law during the mar-
tial-law era in Part III.A, infra.
80. Weng, supra note 78, at 29–30.
81. Wiltraut Rupp v. Brünneck, supra note 17, at 395–99.
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or issuing judicial advice as to the required reform,82  I choose the term 
admonitions of incompatibility in the place of declarations of incompat-
ibility when discussing the TCC case law.83  In addition, to determine the 
TCC’s intention as to incompatibility, invalidity, or just admonition, not 
only the holding but also the reasoning needs to be carefully examined.84
B. Between Dialogue and Directive: Toward a Functional Typology
Echoing literature on dialogical judicial review in comparative 
constitutional law,85 some scholars have interpreted the granting of reme-
dial periods as part of the TCC’s grand strategy to engage the political 
branch in an institutional dialogue aimed at the cooperative solution to 
unconstitutional state acts.86  Departing from this dialogical view, I sug-
gest that the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods be divided into three 
types: bridging, nudging, and hedging.  In the first type, the granting of 
remedial grace periods essentially provides the doctrinal bridge for the 
TCC to move toward a normal constitutional court that can realize its 
institutional potential to strike down the political branch’s unconstitu-
tional acts.  In the second type, the granting of remedial grace periods 
is meant to focus public attention on the TCC’s judgment of or admo-
nition about the unconstitutionality of the impugned state act, thereby 
nudging the political branch to rectify it but without affecting its validity. 
In the third type, the TCC further buttresses its nudging judgments with 
suspended interim measures to hedge against the constitutional risk of 
political inaction at the elapse of the remedial grace period.  As the tem-
poral sequence of the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods suggests, the 
development of bridging, nudging, and hedging reflects the TCC’s move 
from institutional dialogue to constitutional directive in prodding the 
political branch to effectively rectify the declared unconstitutional acts.
1. Bridging: Suspended Declarations of Invalidity
Of the eighty-six interpretations attached with remedial grace 
periods, seventy were suspended declarations of invalidity in terms of 
82. Id. at 388–95; see also Gaier, supra note 21, at 41.
83. Interpretation No. 535 (2001) illustrates the TCC’s ambivalence about ad-
monitory decisions.  For the ambiguities surrounding Interpretation No. 535, see supra 
note 72.
84. Interpretation No. 549 (2002) is thus classified as a proper declaration of 
incompatibility with a remedial grace period, even though the TCC only intimated its 
unconstitutionality judgment in the reasoning.  The official English translation misses 
the genuine meaning of Interpretation No. 549 (2002) in its Chinese original.
85. e.g., Roach, supra note 8; Roach & Budlender, supra note 8.
86. e.g., Yeh Jiunn-rong (葉俊榮), weixian Zhengzhi: Sifa Yuan Dafaguan Fu 
Qixian weixian Jieshi de Shizheng Fenxi (違憲政治司法院大法官附期限違憲解釋的實
證分析) [The Politics of Unconstitutionality: An empirical Analysis of Judicial Dead-
lines and Political Compliance in Taiwan], in 2011 Sifa Zhidu Shizheng Yanjiu (2011 
司法制度實證研究) [2011 Empirical Stud. Jud. Sys.], 1, 15–20 (Chang Yun-Chien (張
永健) ed., 2013), available at http://publication.iias.sinica.edu.tw/90501121.pdf.
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comparative constitutional law, or as I call it, “bridging” judgment.87  As 
will be further discussed, the first bridging judgment Interpretation No. 
218, which concerned an administrative rule, was issued in August 1987, 
a month after the lifting of martial law in Taiwan.  Soon the bridging 
judgment was extended to the invalidation of statutes.  A notable early 
example was Interpretation No. 251 issued in 1990, which was a sequel 
to Interpretation No. 166 issued in 1980.  With an eighteen-month grace 
period,88 the TCC finally gave meaning to the toothless Interpretation 
No. 166 in Interpretation No. 251, ending the condemned long life of the 
Police Punishment Act.89  Since then, bridging has been widely used.  It 
has been applied to both statutes and administrative rules concerning a 
wide range of issues, including the equal parental rights under the Civil 
Code,90 the judicial due process for pretrial detention and other enforce-
ment measures under the Criminal Procedures Act,91 the judicial review 
of martial-court decisions under the Martial Court Procedures Act,92 the 
right to freedom of assembly under the Assemblies and Demonstrations 
Act.93  In addition, the TCC has issued bridging judgments in relation 
to sundry administrative regulations.  Although a substantial proportion 
concerns taxes,94 bridging has been used to address the constitutional 
issues raised by various regulatory policies such as the administration of 
civil aviation,95 the suspension of containers depots,96 the regulation of 
87. They are Interpretation Nos. 218 (1987), 224 (1988), 251 (1990), 289 (1991), 
300 (1992), 313 (1993), 324 (1993), 365 (1994), 366 (1994), 367 (1994), 373 (1995), 380 
(1995), 384 (1995), 390 (1995), 392 (1995), 402 (1996), 423 (1997), 436 (1997), 443 (1997), 
450 (1998), 452 (1998), 454 (1998), 491 (1990), 523 (2001), 551 (2002), 573 (2004), 580 
(2004), 586 (2004), 588 (2005), 598 (2005), 613 (2006), 616 (2006), 619 (2006), 636 
(2008), 638 (2008), 640 (2008), 641(2008), 645 (2008), 649 (2008), 654 (2009), 657 
(2009), 658 (2009), 663 (2009), 664 (2009), 666 (2009), 669 (2009), 670 (2010), 677 
(2010), 680 (2010), 687 (2011), 694 (2011), 696 (2012), 702 (2012), 704 (2012), 707 
(2012), 708 (2013), 709 (2013), 710 (2013), 711 (2013), 716 (2013), 718 (2014), 724 
(2014), 730 (2015), 731 (2015), 733 (2015), 734 (2015), 739 (2016), 749 (2017), 756 
(2017), and 765 (2018).
88. Interpretation No. 251, issued on January 19, 1990, declared the Police Pun-
ishment Act unconstitutional and invalid from July 1, 1991.
89. The TCC first intimated that the Police Punishment Act was unconstitution-
al in Interpretation No. 166 (1980).  I shall further discuss Interpretation Nos. 166 and 
251 in Part III.A, infra.
90. Interpretation No. 365 (1993).
91. Interpretation No. 392 (1995).
92. Interpretation No. 436 (1997).
93. Interpretation No. 718 (2014).
94. e.g., Interpretation Nos. 218 (1987), 224 (1988), 289 (1991), 367 (1994), 616 
(2006), 640 (2008), 641 (2008), 657 (2009), 663 (2009), 687 (2011), 694 (2011), and 696 
(2012).
95. Interpretation No. 313 (1993).
96. Interpretation No. 324 (1993).
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apothecary,97 land redevelopment,98 city general planning,99 benefits for 
school teachers,100 and immigration and border control.101
Generally speaking, the remedial grace period the TCC prescribed 
in bridging judgments ranged from six months to two years.  Although 
the TCC tended to grant the political branch longer remedial grace peri-
ods in the cases concerning statutes than those about administrative 
rules, how the TCC decided on the length of remedial grace periods in 
individual cases was not clear.102  Moreover, there were some conspicu-
ous exceptions.  For example, Interpretation No. 677 gave the political 
branch only two weeks to respond to the declared invalidity of a statu-
tory provision that stipulated that a prisoner be released by noon of the 
next calendar day following the end date of her prison sentence.103  Obvi-
ously, the short remedial grace period was not issued to solicit legislative 
response but to allow the correctional facilities to make corresponding 
arrangements.104  Another outlier was Interpretation No. 613 regard-
ing the National Communications Commission (NCC) Act according to 
which the independent NCC was created, despite the Democratic Pro-
gressive Party (DPP)-controlled Executive’s objections.105  Considering 
the politically charged context of Interpretation No. 613, the TCC unusu-
ally gave the opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan twenty-nine months 
to rectify the impugned statute, which effectively allowed the unconstitu-
tional NCC to sit out the DPP presidential term.106
It is noteworthy that not all the 70 bridging judgments are genuine 
bridging or suspended declarations of invalidity.  Rather, some of them 
are bridging in form only, and are effectively “reading down” or “read-
ing in” interpretations.107  Take Interpretation No. 373 for example.  In 
97. Interpretation No. 711 (2013).
98. Interpretation No. 739 (2016).
99. Interpretation No. 709 (2013).
100. Interpretation No. 707 (2012).
101. Interpretation Nos. 708 (2013) and 710 (2013).
102. Yeh, supra note 69, at 334; Weng, supra note 78, at 37.
103. Interpretation No. 677 (2010).  As the case concerned unlawful imprison-
ment to the extent that the prisoner was imprisoned beyond the end date of her pris-
on sentence according to the impugned provision of the Prison Act, the TCC also 
mandated an interim measure before the expiration of the two-week grace period. 
According to the TCC-mandated interim measure, the prisoners shall be released by 
noon instead of midnight on the end date of her prison sentence.  The exceptional 
TCC-mandated interim measure will be further discussed.  See infra Part II.B.3.
104. This parallels Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which set a grace period 
of thirty days to allow the Federal Election Commission to exercise its powers.  Fish, 
supra note 8, at 360 n. 184.
105. Interpretation No. 613 (2006).
106. For further discussion of the political background of Interpretation No. 613 
(2007), see Ming-Sung Kuo, Moving towards a Nominal Constitutional Court?  Critical 
Reflections on the Shift from Judicial Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan’s 
Constitutional Politics, 25 Wash. Int’l L.J. 597, 617–19 (2016).
107. Such ostensibly bridging judgments include Interpretation Nos. 373 (1995), 
704 (2012), and 718 (2014).
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this judgment, the statutory ban on the unionization of employees in the 
education sector was formally declared invalid, with a one-year grace 
period attached, to the extent that the ban unconstitutionally included 
technicians (技工) and laborers (工友).108  As a result, the political branch 
simply left the impugned statutory provision unchanged as it had been 
read down by the TCC and would thus cease applying to technicians or 
laborers in the education sector after one year from the promulgation of 
Interpretation No. 373.109  As will be discussed shortly, Interpretation No. 
373 was a “hedging” judgment in essence as the TCC actually hedged its 
judgment against the risk of the political branch’s noncompliance with 
the remedy of its own choosing in the same judgment.
More importantly, the example of Interpretation No. 373 illustrated 
the fundamental question: How responsive has the political branch been 
to the TCC’s bridging judgments?  Taking into account the ostensible 
bridging judgments,110  the total number of the lapse of the impugned 
statutes or administrative rules because of the political branch’s failure to 
respond is 21.111  In other words, around 30 percent (21/70) of the bridg-
ing judgments have failed to solicit timely effective responses from the 
political branch.112  As a result, the state of unconstitutionality in those 
cases was only resolved with the lapse of the impugned state acts.  If 
bridging was aimed to solicit legislative or administrative responses to 
resolve the state of unconstitutionality,113 the above record was not very 
108. Interpretation No. 373 (1995).
109. The right to unionize in the education sector was formally recognized in 
2010 when the Labor Union Act was fundamentally reformed.  Jiaoyu Bu (教育
部) [Department of Education], Lifayuan San Du Tongguo Gonghui Fa Xiuzheng 
Cao’an—Kaifang Jiaoshi Chou Zu Gonghui Zhengce Lichang Shuoming (立法院
三讀通過工會法修正草案—開放教師籌組工會政策立場說明) (Jun. 1, 2010), https://
www.edu.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=4F8ED5441E33EA7B&sms=B69F3267D6C0F-
22D&s=A1DC4343FEC8FCAC.
110. Interpretation Nos. 373 (1995), 704 (2012), and 718 (2014).
111. By failure to respond, I refer to the lapse of the impugned state acts at the 
end of the prescribed remedial grace period, even though the political branch react-
ed later or with stopgap measures as Interpretation No. 718 (2014) illustrated.  The 
cases of lapse are Interpretation Nos. 218 (1987), 313 (1993), 366 (1994), 373 (1995), 
380 (1995), 390 (1995), 402 (1996), 450 (1998), 573 (2004), 580 (2004), 586 (2004), 640 
(2008), 654 (2009), 657 (2009), 677 (2010), 696 (2012), 704 (2012), 718 (2014), 731 
(2015), 733 (2015), and 734 (2015).  If we include the examples of statutory or regulato-
ry amendments promulgated after the elapse of the prescribed remedial grace period 
due to procedural delay (Interpretation Nos. 300 (1992), 523 (2001), and 598 (2005)), 
the number will reach 24.  In an empirical, evidence-based analysis, Jiunn-rong Yeh 
notes that during the period from 1987 to September 30, 2011, the political branch 
amended the condemned statutes within the TCC-prescribed grace period around 67 
percent of the time.  Yeh, supra note 86, at 21.  Yet, it is unclear how that percentage 
was calculated as Yeh did not explain or list the cases concerned.  Id.  It is also worth 
pointing out that Yeh did not distinguish between bridging and nudging judgments. 
Id.
112. How the political branch will respond to Interpretation Nos. 749, 756, and 
765 remains unclear as their corresponding remedial grace period has not yet lapsed.
113. The rare examples in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence suggest two 
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encouraging.  There may be different reasons for the political branch not 
to act.  As the ostensible bridging judgment of Interpretation No. 373 
suggests, the political branch’s inertia could be attributed to the TCC’s 
directive-like interventions.  In such ostensible bridging judgments, the 
political branch did not have much incentive to act as no legal vacuum 
would occur thanks to the TCC’s reading down or reading in.  Yet, this 
also calls the wisdom of bridging into question.  As the twenty-odd lapse 
cases suggested, the political branch did not seem to be always concerned 
about the eventual lapse of the impugned state acts as the rationale of 
bridging assumed.
Against that backdrop, the concerns behind the TCC’s wide use of 
bridging became clear.  Although the 70 bridging judgments covered a 
wide range of subjects, they were mainly concerned with the restriction 
of civil rights and liberties.114  Even so, over 41 percent (29/70) of bridging 
judgments declared the political branch’s impugned acts invalid according 
to the constitutional doctrine of “statutory reservation” (Rechtsvorbehalt) 
under the formal rule of law (Rechtsstaat) principle.  Specifically, in such 
cases, the impugned administrative rule was found ultra vires because of 
insufficient statutory basis and thus unconstitutionally restricted rights, 
not for substantive constitutional reasons.115  For these 29 cases, the polit-
ical branch could have redressed the constitutional wrong by simply 
giving the impugned administrative rule a statutory basis or even further 
to reconsider its substance.  Put differently, as the TCC came down on the 
political branch only due to the formal rule of law principle in those 29 
interpretations, its adoption of bridging judgments reflected its restraint 
from getting involved in the substance of the impugned acts.
It is true that legal certainty has carried considerable weight with 
the TCC in choosing bridging judgments.116  Yet, it was not the only value 
in the TCC’s calculation.  As the TCC noted, bridging judgments enabled 
contrasting functions of remedial grace periods.  In contrast to the purpose of granting 
a one-month grace period in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), to allow the Feder-
al Election Commission to exercise power, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a three-
month grace period in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50 (1982), to solicit legislative response to rectify the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 
Unfortunately, Northern Pipeline Construction proved to be a disappointing experi-
ment with the legislative response soliciting remedial grace periods in the U.S.  See 
Fish, supra note 8, at 360–62.
114. Cf. Yeh, supra note 86, at 17–18.
115. The twenty-nine bridging judgments concerned are Interpretation Nos. 218 
(1987), 289 (1991), 313 (1993), 324 (1993), 367 (1994), 380 (1995), 390 (1995), 402 (1996), 
423 (1997), 443 (1997), 454 (1998), 491 (1999), 586 (2004), 598 (2005), 619 (2006), 638 
(2008), 640 (2008), 657 (2009), 658 (2009), 680 (2010), 707 (2012), 710 (2013), 711 
(2013), 724 (2014), 730 (2015), 734 (2015), 739 (2016), 756 and 765.  For a discussion 
of the relationship between “statutory reservation” and the rule of law principle, see 
Ricardo Gosalbo-Bono, The Significance of the Rule of Law and Its Implications for 
the european Union and the United States, 72 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 229, 242 (2010).
116. Hwang Jau-Yuan (黃昭元), Faling “weixian dan Youxiao” Xuangaofangshi 
zhi Zaijiantao (法令[違憲但有效]宣告方式之再檢討), No. 262 Taiwan Faxue (台灣法
學) 39 (2014).
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it to strike the hoped-for balance between legal certainty and other con-
stitutional values.  With a grace period granted, the political branch could 
review substantive constitutional values without being pushed by judicial 
fiat.117  Yet, the record suggests that the TCC’s bridging judgments did not 
always bear fruit.  Instead of taking a substantive review of the impugned 
act proactively, the political branch actually allowed the prescribed grace 
period to elapse in eight cases decided on the bases of statutory reserva-
tion, including Interpretation No. 218, the first bridging judgment.118  In 
view of such mixed experience, the TCC tweaked bridging in face of new 
constitutional challenges, to which now I turn.
2. Nudging: Emphatic Admonitions of Incompatibility
Although the TCC’s first experience with remedial grace periods 
was not particularly reassuring as suggested in the political branch’s mixed 
response to the bridging judgments, bridging remained the TCC’s handy 
weapon to make a constitutional strike.  Should the political branch fail 
to respond by the end of the prescribed remedial grace period, just let the 
impugned act lapse.  So be it.  Nothing is worse than the continuing state 
of unconstitutionality.
Yet, the TCC soon faced new constitutional issues for which lapse 
was not an option the TCC could afford.  Here came Interpretation No. 
455, the first nudging judgment.  Until the TCC issued Interpretation No. 
455 in 1998, it had made 22 bridging judgments since the remedial grace 
period was first adopted in 1987.119  Although seven of the first 22 bridg-
ing judgments had resulted in the lapse of the impugned state acts, this 
did not particularly trouble the TCC when the impugned state acts only 
resulted in the restriction of civil rights and liberties.  Yet, it became a 
problem when the impugned state act provided the legal basis for benefi-
cial entitlements.  Should it be allowed to lapse, the eligible beneficiaries 
would lose their legal entitlements.  Thus, to address issues concern-
ing differential treatment, Interpretation No. 455 only declared that the 
impugned interpretive circular was incompatible with the constitutional 
principle of equality and prescribed a one-year remedial grace period.
In contrast to the TCC’s previous declarations of unconstitu-
tionality, Interpretation No. 455 had two features.  First, it was not a 
(suspended) declaration of invalidity as the impugned administrative act 
was only declared constitutionally incompatible.  With the elapse of the 
prescribed remedial grace period, the declared unconstitutional state act 
117. The TCC did not explain why the declaration of invalidity was suspended in 
the first bridging judgment Interpretation No. 218 (1987).  Yet, more than a generation 
later, it provided a retrospective justification in the reasoning of Interpretation No. 
725 (2014) along the lines of thinking as noted above.
118. The impugned interpretive circular lapsed on February 14, 1988 when the 
sixth-month grace period ended while the Ministry of Finance incorporated its con-
tent into the Implementation Rule of the Income Tax Act on May 30, 1988.
119. Interpretation No. 218 (1987).
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would have remained in force had the administration failed to respond.120 
Second, Interpretation No. 455 was not just a traditional declaration of 
incompatibility or an admonitory decision proper.  Rather, with a reme-
dial grace period attached to the declaration of incompatibility, it was 
aimed to bring the state of unconstitutionality resulting from the political 
branch’s act to the foreground of public attention.  With such a nudge, the 
TCC expected the political branch to act accordingly.121
Since then, the TCC has issued nine nudging judgments in total.122 
Although the TCC initially applied nudging to issues concerning equal 
treatment,123 it has extended it further to issues requiring structural adjust-
ment, including the national health insurance plan,124 the organization of 
the Judicial Yuan,125 the statutory basis of policing activities,126 and the 
provision for judicial review of remanded prisoners’ complaints.127  Apart 
from the first two nudging judgments that concerned administrative rules 
and the deviant Interpretation No. 760,128 all the other six interpretations 
required statutory amendment.  For this reason, the TCC prescribed a 
two-year remedial grace period in those six cases while requesting the 
administration to change the impugned administrative rules within six 
months in other nudging judgments.  Yet, facing the TCC’s nudging, the 
political branch did not often budge.
The record of how the political branch responded to the TCC’s 
nudging raised serious doubt about its wisdom.  The political branch 
responded to the first two nudging judgments in a timely and effective 
manner indeed.129  Yet, when it concerned issues concerning structural 
120. Although the TCC usually included legislative advice in its nudging judg-
ments, it was not legally binding on the political branch.
121. The then Senior Grand Justice Weng published one of his few concurring 
opinions to elucidate the TCC’s move from bridging to nudging in Interpretation No. 
455 (1998) along these lines.  He further suggested that should the political branch 
fail to rectify constitutional flaws within the prescribed remedial grace period, the 
state would then incur liability and the courts could make remedial orders case by 
case.  Unfortunately, the TCC did not move in that direction in its subsequent nudging 
judgments.
122. Interpretation Nos. 455 (1998), 457 (1998), 524 (2001), 530 (2001), 535 
(2001), 549 (2002), 653 (2008), 745 (2017), and 760 (2018).
123. Interpretation Nos. 455 (1998) and 457 (1998) were issued in 1998.  The TCC 
further issued three nudging judgments in this regard: Interpretation Nos. 549 (2002), 
745 (2017), and 760 (2018).
124. Interpretation No. 524 (2001).
125. Interpretation No. 530 (2001).
126. Interpretation No. 535 (2001).
127. Interpretation No. 653 (2008).
128. The latest nudging judgment, Interpretation No. 760 (2018), deviates from 
the previous ones in one important aspect.  Although what was found constitution-
ally incompatible is a statutory provision, the prescribed six-month grace period is 
concerned with the remedial measures expected of the administrative departments 
involved.
129. Interpretation Nos. 455 (1998) and 457 (1998).  A more recent example fall-
ing in this line is Interpretation No. 745 (2017).  The impugned statutory provision was 
amended one year before the expiration of the two-year grace period.
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adjustment, nudging mostly fell short of moving the political branch.130 
The first sign of trouble emerged from the first structural nudging judg-
ment, Interpretation No. 524, which concerned the complex national 
health insurance plan.  Taiwan instituted national health insurance in 
1994.  Before Interpretation No. 524 was issued in 2001, the TCC had 
issued an admonitory decision in 1999,131 requesting the political branch 
to address the concerns raised over some provisions of the National 
Health Insurance Act.  The political branch was unresponsive to the 
TCC’s admonition.  In its second encounter, the TCC made a declara-
tion of incompatibility with respect to other provisions of the National 
Health Insurance Act and prescribed the political branch to rectify its 
constitutional flaws as well as address the issues raised in its 1999 admon-
itory decision within two years.  Yet, it took the political branch almost 
another 10 years to fully address the issues raised in both judgments.132 
Eventually, the political branch did budge but only after the prescribed 
grace period in nudging had expired.
If Interpretation No. 524 fell short in that it only solicited late 
responses from the political branch, the other structural nudging interpre-
tations failed conspicuously.  In Interpretation No. 530, the TCC declared 
the existing Judicial Yuan, which had stood as the umbrella body of judi-
cial administration since its reconstitution in 1947,133 incompatible with 
the constitutional provision for the Judicial Yuan as the supreme judicial 
body and prescribed that the Judicial Yuan be reorganized accordingly 
through legislation within two years.  Since its promulgation in 2001, the 
Judicial Yuan has remained as unconstitutional as it was over 18 years ago.
The political branch’s indifference to nudging in the foregoing two 
cases could be attributed to the broad ramifications from legal complex-
ity or structural reorganization involved.  Yet, facing Interpretation No. 
549 issued in 2002, the political branch was explicitly defiant.  Before the 
TCC were several provisions concerning the entitlement of the insured’s 
child to receive the insured’s payment under the Workers Insurance Act. 
For reasons of moral hazard, the impugned statute imposed additional 
restrictions on the insured’s adopted child, which the TCC declared 
incompatible with the constitutional principle of equality.  Interpre-
tation No. 549 nudged the political branch with a prescribed two-year 
130. The exception was Interpretation No. 535 (2001) concerning the statutory 
basis of policing activities.  Still, it is noteworthy that in this admonitory decision, the 
TCC read in the proportionality principle with respect to the core provision of the 
impugned Policing Act.  In response to Interpretation No. 535 (2001), the political 
branch left that core provision unchanged in the new statute.
131. Interpretation No. 472 (1999).
132. The National Health Insurance Act and the delegated administrative rules 
had been amended several times after Interpretation No. 524 (2001).  Yet, those 
amendments did not satisfy all the requirements prescribed in Interpretation No. 524 
(2001) until 2011.
133. The current working constitution in Taiwan came into effect in 1947.  See 
Yeh, supra note 75, at 29–32; see also Hwang et al., supra note 71, at 754–55.
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remedial grace period to rectify it.  The political branch did not amend the 
impugned statute until 2008, four years after the grace period had already 
elapsed.  Even worse was that the core provision (article 27), which the 
TCC declared constitutionally incompatible, was left unchanged.  Again 
nudging did not result in budging.
The next nudging judgment, Interpretation No. 653 issued in 2008, 
was the last straw.  Apart from the implicated structural adjustment, it 
concerned a core issue of civil rights and liberties: remanded prison-
ers’ right to judicial review of complaints about their treatment under 
the pretrial detention.  Although the Pre-Trial Detention Act provided 
for administrative review of such complaints, the TCC declared the 
impugned provision incompatible with the constitutional requirement of 
judicial protection and prescribed the political branch to make provision 
for judicial review of remanded prisoners’ complaints through legislation 
within two years.  Notably, the TCC did not issue a declaration of invalid-
ity for fear of the lapse of the existing administrative review mechanism 
should the political branch fail to respond in time.  Again, the political 
branch did not budge and the unconstitutional deprivation of remanded 
prisoners’ right to judicial review continued for another six years after 
the TCC’s nudging in 2008.  It took another judicial intervention, Inter-
pretation No. 720, to rectify the unconstitutional Pre-Trial Detention 
Act.134  Only this time, the TCC did not turn to a bridging judgment or a 
straightforward declaration of invalidity, let alone another nudging judg-
ment.  Instead, Interpretation No. 720 itself made provisions for judicial 
review of remanded prisoner’s complaints by extending the Criminal 
Procedures Code to cases of pretrial detention, paving the way for the 
TCC’s further tweaking of the granting of remedial grace periods.
Taken as a whole, nudging turns out to be a disappointing exper-
iment with the blending of different declarations of unconstitutionality 
with the granting of remedial grace periods, though it is not a total fail-
ure.  With the deepening of TCC’s intervention in constitutional issues 
requiring structural adjustment, the political branch became more and 
more reluctant to budge in face of nudging judgments.  Apart from its 
early successes, nudging judgments were mostly tantamount to admo-
nitions of incompatibility albeit with the emphatic note of a prescribed 
remedial grace period.
3. Hedging: Nudging Buttressed With Suspended Interim Relief
With the defects of nudging exposed in the interpretations as 
discussed above, the TCC was forced to mull over its choices.  If the disap-
pointing nudging judgments failed in that they fell short of a declaration 
of invalidity, reverting to bridging seemed to be the way out.  Interpreta-
tion No. 707 was such an example.  Interpretation No. 707 issued in 2012 
concerned a nonstatutory administrative rule regarding the benefits of 
school teachers.  Although it fell in line with the first nudging judgment 
134. J.Y. Interpretation No. 720 (2014).
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as both concerned legal entitlements, the TCC opted for bridging in this 
case.135  Notably, the TCC granted an unusually generous three-year 
remedial grace period so the political branch could provide the required 
statutory framework, which was eventually legislated six months before 
the end of the prescribed grace period.
Bridging could have been the TCC’s response to the political 
branch’s indifference to its nudging judgments.  Yet, the initial concerns 
behind the TCC’s move from bridging to nudging remained.  What if the 
political branch failed to respond to Interpretation No. 707?  Would it 
have been better for the TCC to turn to bridging in the frustrated nudging 
judgment concerning judicial administration?  Had the political branch 
remained unresponsive to a bridging judgement in that case, would it 
be wise to let the Judicial Yuan’s unconstitutional organization collapse 
at the end of the prescribed remedial grace period?  All things consid-
ered, bridging was too risky to be applied to cases implicating structural 
adjustment or beneficial entitlements, even though Interpretation No. 
707 turned out to be a success story in 2015.
With the political branch’s response to Interpretation No. 707 still 
uncertain, the TCC issued the abovementioned Interpretation No. 720 in 
2014 to realize the purpose of the nudging used in Interpretation No. 653 
whose prescribed two-year remedial grace period had already elapsed in 
2010.  The TCC imposed interim relief in Interpretation No. 720 to rectify 
the constitutional flaws it had condemned in Interpretation No. 653 in 
2008.  Taken together, Interpretation Nos. 653 and 720 were not so much 
two separate interpretations as two parts of a single judgment: a nudging 
judgment followed by the TCC-prescribed interim relief six years later. 
Down this road was the third type of the TCC’s applications of remedial 
grace periods: hedging, a nudging judgment buttressed with suspended 
interim relief.
A thought experiment will help to see the distinctiveness of hedg-
ing judgements.  Suppose Interpretation No. 653 had mandated the same 
interim relief the TCC later imposed in Interpretation No. 720, alongside 
a declaration of incompatibility, but suspended the interim measures until 
after the political branch failed to provide the required constitutional 
redress within a grace period of six instead of two years.  The result of this 
hypothetical judgment would be exactly the same as the joint effect of 
Interpretation Nos. 653 and 720.  In this hypothetical scenario, the TCC 
buttressed its nudging judgment with interim measures that would only 
be enforceable when the political branch failed to respond at the end 
of the prescribed remedial grace period.  In this way, the remedial grace 
period is not just a legal technique to focus public attention.  Nor does it 
suspend the declaration of unconstitutionality as, strictly speaking, a dec-
laration of incompatibility (mere unconstitutionality) implicates no legal 
135. Both Vice President-Grand Justice Yeong-Chin Su (蘇永欽) and Grand Jus-
tice Chang-fa Lo (羅昌發) noted that Interpretation No. 707 was the first bridging 
interpretation concerning beneficial entitlements.
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effects that need to be suspended for reasons of legal certainty.  Rather, 
a remedial grace period granted in such judgments effectively suspends 
the prescribed interim measures, allowing the political branch to have 
the first say over how to rectify the constitutional wrong.  With interim 
measures prescribed but suspended until the end of the remedial grace 
periods, the TCC hedges its judgment against the political branch’s indif-
ference to its emphatic admonitions or declarations of incompatibility in 
issues implicating structural adjustment or beneficial entitlements.  This 
is what underlies the TCC’s transition from nudging to hedging.
Since the TCC issued its first hedging judgment, Interpretation No. 
737, in 2016, it has issued five interpretations that declare the impugned 
statutory provisions constitutionally incompatible and which are but-
tressed with suspended interim measures.136  All these five judgments 
concern statutory underinclusiveness.137  Take the most famous hedg-
ing judgment, the Same-Sex Marriage Case,138 for example.  In this case, 
the TCC declared the marriage provisions in the Civil Code incompati-
ble with the constitutional provisions for equal protection and freedom 
of marriage to the extent that the current Civil Code only provided for 
opposite-sex marriage.  Instead of striking down the existing marriage 
provisions, the TCC has granted the political branch a two-year grace 
period to redress the constitutional wrong.  Yet, mindful that the political 
branch may fail to respond accordingly, the TCC further provides for a 
suspended interim measure by decreeing that the current Civil Code will 
extend to same-sex couples at the expiration of the grace period.
Obviously, a bridging judgment, not to mention a straightforward 
declaration of invalidity, was not the best way to address the condition of 
unconstitutionality in the Same-Sex Marriage Case.  Had the case been 
decided in the form of a bridging judgment and should the marriage 
provisions have lapsed at the end of the remedial grace period, it would 
simply have resulted in the dismantling of the entire legal institution of 
marriage instead of realizing same-sex couples’ equal right to marriage. 
To avoid such a scenario, the TCC only made a declaration of incompat-
ibility as to the marriage provisions in the Civil Code.  At the same time, 
the TCC has prescribed and suspended interim relief to avoid repeating 
the mistakes it had made in the nudging judgments.  Seen in this light, 
hedging is an offshoot of nudging, not bridging.
It is noteworthy that not all issues implicating structural adjustment 
or beneficial entitlements are suitable for a hedging judgment.  For exam-
ple, it would be inconceivable for the TCC to prescribe how to deicide 
136. Interpretation Nos. 737 (2016), 742 (2016), 747, 748 (2017), and 762.
137. For issues of constitutional conformity resulting from statutory underinclu-
siveness, see Miller & Devins, supra note 6, at 151.
138. Interpretation No. 748 (2017).  See generally Ming-Sung Kuo & Hui-Wen 
Chen, The Brown Moment in Taiwan: Making Sense of the Law and Politics of the 
Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case in a Comparative Light, 31 Colum. J. Asian L. 72 
(2017).  For the post–Interpretation No. 748 politics about Taiwanese same-sex mar-
riage legislation, see id. at 140–45; Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1020–22.
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and calculate deductible cost and taxable income under the Income 
Tax Act on its own.139  In contrast, as the Same-Sex Marriage Case illus-
trates, hedging judgments have concerned the state of unconstitutionality 
resulting from the under-inclusiveness of the impugned statutory pro-
vision.  In such cases, the TCC have prescribed interim relief by simply 
extending the impugned provisions to those not included in the original 
statutory scheme.  For example, according to the TCC-decreed interim 
relief in the Same-Sex Marriage Case, the current provisions in the Civil 
Code that provided for only opposite-sex marriage would be applicable 
to same-sex couples with the necessary modifications should the political 
branch fail to amend the Civil Code at the two-year grace period’s end.
As noted above, hedging amounts to an offshoot of nudging, or 
rather, nudging buttressed with suspended interim relief.  In line with this 
development, nudging can be further fortified with immediate interim 
relief, giving rise to the augmented edition of hedging.  Interpretation No. 
755 is such a case.140  At issue in this interpretation was the preclusion of 
judicial review of prisoners’ complaints about the administrative and dis-
ciplinary measures taken by the correctional facilities under the Prison 
Act and the corresponding enforcement rule.  The TCC declared the 
impugned statutory and regulatory provisions incompatible with the con-
stitution to the extent that the measures taken by the correctional facilities 
infringed prisoners’ fundamental rights beyond the de minimis exception 
and were excluded from judicial review.  Paralleling the classical hedg-
ing judgments, this case concerned a state of unconstitutionality resulting 
from statutory over-inclusiveness,141 for the rectification of which the 
TCC has granted the political branch a two-year remedial grace period.
What makes Interpretation No. 755 a hedging instead of a nudging 
judgment is that the TCC has further prescribed interim relief.  Prisoners 
would be allowed to seek judicial review of the non-de minimis adminis-
trative or disciplinary measures taken by the correctional facilities under 
another statutory scheme governing administrative litigations should the 
political branch fail to respond at the expiration of the two-year period. 
Yet, in contrast to hedging simpliciter, the TCC has taken a step fur-
ther as the remedial grace period did not apply to the TCC-mandated 
interim measure.  In other words, instead of suspending the interim mea-
sure, the TCC has given immediate effect to it.  By substituting its own 
interim measure for the impugned statutory and regulatory provisions 
without delay, the TCC has effectively set aside the impugned statutory 
and regulatory provisions albeit short of a straightforward declaration 
of invalidity.
139. Interpretation No. 745 (2017) (a nudging judgment).
140. Interpretation No. 755 (2017).
141. For the closeness of over-inclusiveness to under-inclusiveness in constitu-
tional review, see Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judi-
cial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 1049, 1061 (1979).
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The foregoing features raise issues about the function of the two-
year remedial grace period granted in Interpretation No. 755.  As the 
granted grace period suspends neither the effect of constitutional invalid-
ity nor the interim measure, it seems to come closer to its counterpart in 
the nudging judgments, which is prescribed to focus public attention on 
the TCC’s judgment.  Yet, Interpretation No. 755 is anything but a nudg-
ing judgment as the rectification of the state of unconstitutionality does 
not rely on the political branch’s cooperation.  In this sense, Interpreta-
tion No. 755 is a hedging judgment, and an augmented one at that, as it 
does not suspend the effect of the TCC-mandated interim measure.
A close read further suggests that augmented hedging is a new twist 
in the TCC’s prescription for remedial grace periods in a deeper sense. 
As observed above, the TCC effectively set aside the impugned statu-
tory and regulatory provisions with immediate effect by replacing them 
with its own interim measure, despite the remedial grace period.  In other 
words, the TCC could achieve the same effect by making a straightfor-
ward declaration of invalidity and prescribing a more detailed interim 
measure.142  Seen in this light, the granting of a remedial grace period 
in the augmented edition of hedging judgments cannot be duly grasped 
with reference only to hedging simpliciter or fully explained within the 
tripartite functional typology.
Since 2016, the TCC has issued seven hedging, simpliciter and aug-
mented, judgments in total.143  Considering the complex calculation of 
interim relief, the TCC may soon reach its institutional limit in its expan-
sion of hedging judgments.  Yet, the emergence of the augmented edition 
seems to suggest otherwise.  As the TCC’s new self-image as a court is 
being gradually shifting focus from the pronouncement on constitutional 
principles to the implementation of constitutional rights for the people,144 
augmented hedging can be seen as the TCC’s early attempt at the pro-
vision of equitable remedies required in individual litigations.  Even so, 
that the TCC has continued to prescribe a remedial grace period in the 
augmented hedging judgments where it plays no functional role remains 
a puzzle to be solved.
III. Choice or Default?  When Remedial Grace Periods 
Become Routine
The foregoing functional analysis shows how the TCC has endeav-
ored to apply the framework of graduated unconstitutionality it borrowed 
from the civilian-continental model of constitutional law to address 
142. Grand Justice Chang-Fa LO (羅昌發) alluded to this point in his concurring 
opinion.
143. Among them, two are augmented.  Apart from Interpretation No. 755, the 
other augmented hedging judgment is Interpretation No. 763 (2018).  For other hedg-
ing judgments, see supra note 136.
144. This is embodied in the recent Constitutional Litigation Act, which is set to 
come into effect in 2022.  See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1022–26.
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constitutional wrongs resulting from the political branch’s unconstitu-
tional acts with the help of remedial grace periods.  Nevertheless, that 
account leaves the key question unanswered: Why has the TCC turned to 
remedial grace periods in the first place?  As noted in Part II, one school 
of thought answers this question from the perspective of judicial poli-
tics, arguing that the TCC has strategically chosen to prescribe remedial 
grace periods in its unconstitutionality judgments to engage the political 
branch in institutional dialogue.145  Alternatively, the doctrinal perspec-
tive attributes the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods to considerations 
of legal certainty.146  I take issue with such views.
Tracking the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods, I argue that the 
granting of remedial grace periods has become routine as a function of 
the TCC’s evolving role in Taiwan’s changing constitutional landscape. 
In the following, I first sketch out the TCC’s performance record under 
martial law and the rare instances of its intimation of the constitutional 
incompatibility of the political branch’s acts.  Then, apart from pin-
ning down the critical juncture when remedial grace periods were first 
adopted in the TCC case law, I explain why instead of a deliberate choice, 
the granting of remedial grace periods has been routinized as the TCC’s 
default option in face of unconstitutional state acts.
A. Speaking (Half) Truth to Power: The TCC’s Delphic Intimations 
of Constitutional Incompatibility Under Martial Law
The TCC has been praised for its active role in Taiwan’s transition 
from a party-state to a robust constitutional democracy starting from 
the 1980s so much so that two of its most perceptive observers even 
allude to a parallel between the TCC and the acclaimed South Afri-
can Constitutional Court.147  Yet, before it started to flex muscle with its 
democracy-facilitating interpretations, the TCC had already built up its 
case law during its formative years (1948–85) soon after its inaugura-
tion in the then Chinese national capital, Nanjing, in 1948.  Although the 
early TCC case law was mostly concerned with the run-of-the-mill issues 
about conflicting legal interpretations between government departments 
or ordinary courts,148 the TCC did exercise its constitutionally ordained 
jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation during that period.149  Despite 
their fading influence, the few instances of constitutional review decided 
in the TCC formative years has cast a long shadow on its subsequent case 
law, including the use of remedial grace periods.
The TCC has exercised jurisdiction of constitutional interpretation 
since its inception even though it was then engulfed in the Chinese Civil 
145. Yeh, supra note 75, at 181–83; Yeh, supra note 86, at 15–21.
146. Hwang, supra note 116, at 40.
147. See David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial Dia-
logue, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 523, 538 (2011).
148. These interpretations concern unification interpretations.
149. For the TCC’s early history and role under the martial-law rule, see Lin et 
al., supra note 67, at 1002–09.
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War.150  This by no means suggests that the early TCC was the TCC as 
we know it.  Instead, apart from setting aside some judicial precedents 
or pre-constitutional judicial interpretations,151 the TCC was anything 
but an active constitutional player.  It was more of a convenient prob-
lem-solver for the political branch when the political branch needed 
constitutional cover for its decisions than an independent guardian of the 
constitution.152  That said, the early TCC was not reduced to a constitu-
tional rubberstamp, either.  Rather, it had issued two unconstitutionality 
judgements before the influential Fifth Council took office in 1985:153 
Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166, which had preconditioned the way the 
TCC approached the constitutional validity of the political branch’s acts 
in postauthoritarian Taiwan.154
The TCC issued Interpretation No. 86 in 1960 when Taiwan was 
still at the height of “White Terror.”155  Interpretation No. 86 concerned 
whether the Judicial Yuan was exclusively responsible for judicial admin-
istration.156  At stake was the constitutionality of the then Ministry of 
Judicial Administration under the Executive Yuan, which sat atop all the 
judicial courts apart from the TCC, the Supreme Court, and the High 
Court of Administrative Litigations as well as the Civil Servants Dis-
ciplinary Commission.  If the Ministry of Judicial Administration was 
found unconstitutional, the executive’s direct control over the judiciary 
would be weakened.  Although the TCC dodged the question of whether 
the Ministry of Judicial Administration was constitutional or not, it was 
explicit that the Judicial Yuan was exclusively responsible for the entire 
judicial administration according to the constitution and further noted 
that the statutes concerned should be amended accordingly.157
Interpretation No. 86 was unprecedented as it was the first TCC 
judgment that put the constitutionality of the political branch’s act (the 
Organic Law of the Ministry of Judicial Administration) into question. 
It is true that the TCC fell far short of providing a clear answer to the 
constitutional question in Interpretation No. 86.  Nevertheless, its gist is 
hard to miss when read in light of the referral document.  Even so, Inter-
pretation No. 86 failed to put an end to the Organic Law of the Ministry 
of Judicial Administration as the TCC barely declared it unconstitu-
tional, not to mention invalid (or void).  It was not until 1980 that judicial 
150. Interpretation Nos. 1 and 2 were issued in 1949 when the TCC remained 
seated in Nanjing.  See Hwang et al., supra note 71, at 755.
151. See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1009–10.
152. Yeh, supra note 75, at 171–72.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 70–72.
154. See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1009–10, n. 67.
155. See generally Ketty W. Chen, Disciplining Taiwan: The Kuomintang’s Meth-
ods of Control during the white Terror era (1947–1987), 4 Taiwan Int’l Stud. Q. 185 
(2008).
156. See supra note 67.
157. For a helpful guide to Interpretation No. 86, see Chang et al., supra note 69, 
at 456–57.
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administration was returned to the Judicial Yuan while the Ministry of 
Judicial Administration was reorganized as the current Ministry of Jus-
tice.  Seen in this light, Interpretation No. 86 is the TCC’s first intimation 
of constitutional incompatibility concerning the political branch’s acts.
After Interpretation No. 86, it took 20 years for the TCC to question 
the constitutionality of the political branch’s act again in Interpretation 
No. 166.158  According to the Police Punishment Act, which had already 
existed before the constitution came into effect in 1947, the police were 
given the power to punish those who committed misdemeanours with a 
brief jail sentence or compulsory labor without a court trial.  The legal 
question before the TCC was whether the Police Punishment Act was 
consistent with the due process provision in the constitution.  As that 
statute had been frequently invoked by the police for the purposes of 
social control, the authoritarian police state regime was effectively put 
under the spotlight because of Interpretation No. 166.  In 1980 when the 
end of the martial-law rule was still seven years away, the TCC issued its 
landmark decision relating to fundamental rights, Interpretation No. 166, 
urging the political branch to amend the Police Punishment Act in accor-
dance with the constitutional requirement of judicial due process.  It was 
historic indeed.  Yet, the TCC again dodged the question of whether the 
Police Punishment Act was constitutional or not.  Instead, it simply para-
phrased the constitutional provision of due process and then urged the 
political branch to act accordingly without condemning the constitutional 
invalidity of the impugned statute directly.  It came as no surprise that the 
political branch was unmoved in face of the TCC’s intimation of constitu-
tional incompatibility.  Eventually it took another 10 years for the TCC to 
realize the goal of Interpretation No. 166 with another judicial interven-
tion, Interpretation No. 251,159 in which the Police Punishment Act was 
ordered to lapse after July 1, 1991 unless amended according to Interpre-
tation Nos. 166 and 251.
Standing as exceptions to the TCC jurisprudence under martial law, 
Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166 have exerted disproportionate influence 
on the TCC’s subsequent exercise of constitutional review.  As noted 
above, neither Interpretation No. 86 nor Interpretation No. 166 attacked 
the unconstitutionality of the political branch’s acts.  To be more precise, 
neither interpretation addressed the constitutionality of the impugned 
state acts directly.  Instead, the unconstitutionality judgment had to be 
inferred from the TCC’s veiled reasoning in these two interpretations. 
In other words, the TCC barely made any declaration of constitutional-
ity as to the political branch’s acts, whether in the form of invalidity or 
incompatibility, during the martial-law era.  Only by reading between the 
lines were the TCC’s Delphic intimations of constitutional incompatibil-
ity in these two decisions disclosed.  The TCC did speak truth to power 
but failed to reveal the whole truth.  In sum, the TCC did not make any 
158. Interpretation No. 166 (1980).
159. Interpretation No. 251 (1990).
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declaration of invalidity with respect to the political branch’s acts in its 
early exercise of constitutional review apart from two frustrated intima-
tions of constitutional incompatibility.
The TCC’s quiet and indirect disapproval of the political branch in 
its formative stage may have resulted from the TCC’s prudent choice in 
face of a quasi-military dictatorship.  Yet, with the early intimations of 
constitutional incompatibility translating into the TCC’s gentle approach 
to the question of the constitutionality of the political branch’s acts, the 
TCC’s decisions on the constitutionality of the impugned state acts have 
since been meandering and elusive.  As a legacy of the Delphic style 
set out in its early case law, judicial euphemism has become the hall-
mark of the TCC’s constitutional jurisprudence.160  This explains why 
the TCC’s declarations of invalidity read like the GFCC’s declarations 
of incompatibility while the line is sometimes blurred between declara-
tions of incompatibility and admonitory decisions in the TCC case law as 
noted in Part II.
More importantly, as Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166 indicated, mere 
declarations of incompatibility, not to mention cautious intimations, were 
nothing more than a paper tiger in the eyes of the recalcitrant political 
branch.  To bring about meaningful changes, the TCC itself must change. 
Thus, how to tame the political beast without being devoured by the 
remaining forceful leviathan sets the future direction of the cautious TCC 
on its move toward becoming the constitution’s guardian as we know it.
B. The Coming of Constitutional Grace: Democratization, Judicial 
Awakening,  and Remedial Grace Periods in Taiwan
To shed light on how remedial grace periods were employed in 
the TCC’s response to the political branch’s unconstitutional acts, I first 
trace their adoption when Taiwan was in transition from an autocratic 
party-state to a full-fledged constitutional democracy in the late 1980s. 
After drawing out the relationship between the TCC’s awakening and 
the emergence of remedial grace periods, I then explain why the granting 
of remedial grace periods is more of a default position than a strategic 
choice in constitutional review in Taiwan.
1. At the Dawn of Democratization: Reining in the Political 
Branch With Grace
As suggested above, the TCC experienced a long formative stage 
starting from 1948 to the end of September 1985 when the term of the 
Fourth Council came to an end.  At that time, the Nationalists (also 
known as Kuomintang, KMT) defeated in the Chinese Civil War had 
ruled Taiwan with martial law for over 35 years and the strongman Chiang 
Ching-Kuo’s poor health was continuingly deteriorating after assuming 
the mantle of Chiang dynasty at the death of his father Generalissimo 
160. Cf. Lin et al., supra note 67 (discussing the influence of institutional continu-
ity on the TCC).
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Chiang Kai-Shek in 1975.161  While the winds of change were blowing, 
there was still no sign for the lifting of martial law when the Fifth Coun-
cil took office in October 1985.  Against this backdrop, the TCC set out to 
turn itself into the constitution’s guardian.
The reconstituted TCC soon issued its first decision in November 
1985.  Continuing with the previous cautious approach to the constitu-
tionality of the political branch’s acts, the TCC affirmed the impugned 
administrative regulation’s constitutionality.162  Yet, it did not take long for 
the TCC to break new ground in constitutional review.  Approximately a 
year after assuming office, the recently appointed Grand Justices declared 
a political branch’s act unconstitutional for the first time.  Interpretation 
No. 210, which was promulgated on October 17, 1986, expressly declared 
unconstitutional an interpretive circular concerning taxation issued by 
the Ministry of Finance for its failure to comport with the constitutional 
requirement of statutory reservation.163  Despite the technical character 
of the impugned interpretive circular, the declaration of unconstitutional-
ity/incompatibility itself, which found support in the civilian-continental 
framework of graduated unconstitutionality, was groundbreaking as the 
TCC had never directly condemned any act of the political branch before 
that judgment.  10 months later, the TCC delivered its first declaration 
of invalidity as to the political branch’s acts, another two tax interpretive 
circulars issued by the Ministry of Finance, in Interpretation No. 218 on 
August 14, 1987.  As noted in Part II, a remedial grace period was granted 
in Interpretation No. 218, making it the TCC’s first bridging judgment, 
i.e., a suspended declaration of invalidity.  Read together, Interpretation 
Nos. 210 and 218 appeared to suggest that the TCC marked its departure 
from its decades-long formative stage by making a straight declaration 
of incompatibility and then took a strategic turn.  With the granting of a 
grace period, Interpretation No. 218 delayed the impact of a declaration 
of invalidity yet without repeating the mistake of the abovementioned 
Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166 if the political branch would remain as 
aloof as it had been.  In this light, Interpretation Nos. 210 and 218 jointly 
exerted a seminal influence on the TCC’s dual role in Taiwan’s transi-
tion to constitutional democracy: the TCC awakened to the public calls 
for liberty and democracy with its transition-facilitating decisions while 
exercising judicial prudence to engage rather than confront the political 
branch with strategic interpretations.164
On closer inspection, however, the storyline of the TCC as the 
democracy facilitator turns out to be more tortuous than suggested in 
161. Chiang Ching-Kuo was Premier of the Executive Yuan when his father 
died and elected President in 1978. Eric Pace, Chiang Ching-Kuo Dies at 77, ending 
a Dynasty on Taiwan, N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/14/ 
obituaries/chiang-ching-kuo-dies-at-77-ending-a-dynasty-on-taiwan.html.
162. Interpretation No. 200 (1985).
163. According to the TCC, the impugned interpretive circular was an ultra vires 
administrative act as it lacked statutory basis.
164. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 106–57.
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the foregoing rosy projection.  As noted above, Interpretation No. 210 
declared an interpretive circular of the Ministry of Finance incompatible 
with the constitution.  Juxtaposed with Interpretation Nos. 86 and 166, 
Interpretation No. 210 nonetheless seemed to be a big stride made by the 
TCC as it no longer just intimated the unconstitutionality of the politi-
cal branch’s acts gingerly in its judgment.  Yet, a close read of the TCC’s 
reasoning reveals that the stride turned out to be merely a symbolic and 
little step.  Interpretation No. 210 was a posthumous announcement 
of a “dead” administrative act: the impugned interpretive circular had 
already been rescinded before the judgment was promulgated.165  Instead 
of sentencing it to death, the TCC essentially issued an obituary about 
the deceased interpretive circular.  Speaking the words of constitutional 
incompatibility, Interpretation No. 210 was the epitome of judicial sym-
bolism.166  Even such a little symbolic step was still significant indeed, 
only it was not symbolic of gradual judicial awakening in Taiwan but of 
the TCC’s sensitivity to signs of political change.  October 17, 1986, the 
promulgation date of Interpretation No. 210, was revealing.
As suggested above, when the newly appointed Grand Justices 
assumed office in October 1985, the political atmosphere was tense in 
Taiwan.  Winds of political change were blowing but nobody knew 
whither the blowing wind would take Taiwan.  Defying the standing strict 
ban on new political parties under martial law, the leading political dis-
sidents convened the DPP’s founding assembly on September 28, 1986. 
Political crackdown was anxiously anticipated.  When Taiwan was kept 
in suspense, the frail Chiang Ching-Kuo gave his most important inter-
view to Washington Post on October 7, 1986, surprising the world with the 
announcement that martial law would be lifted shortly.167  10 days later 
came the obituary-like Interpretation No. 210, suggesting the TCC’s sym-
bolic change in its institutional posture vis-a-vis the political branch.  Yet, 
considering its posthumous declaration of incompatibility and its virtual 
synchronization with the intimations of political liberalization in 1986, 
Interpretation No. 210 instead attested to the reconstituted TCC’s con-
tinuation with the habitual cautious approach to constitutional review 
when political thaw was beginning in Taiwan but spring was not there yet.
If Interpretation No. 210 was the TCC’s symbolic move at the outset 
of political thaw, the granting of a remedial grace period in Interpretation 
165. Only in the reasoning was Interpretation No. 210’s posthumous character 
disclosed.  See Interpretation No. 210 (1986).
166. With its posthumous declaration of the unconstitutionality of the impugned 
interpretive circular, Interpretation No. 210 enabled the individual claimant whose 
rights had been infringed because of that circular to apply for a retrial.  For the en-
abling effect of Interpretations on applications for retail, see Interpretation No. 185 
(1984).
167. Daniel Southerl, Taiwan President to Propose end to Island’s Martial Law, 
Wash. Post (Oct. 8, 1986), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ politics/1986/10/08/
taiwan-president-to-propose-end-to-islands-martial-law/363c7248-ccc9-4173-8599-
419a587b5800/?utm_term=.1bdfdb8e726a [https://perma.cc/A99T-K9D7].
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No. 218 was indicative of the TCC’s restrained method of striking down 
the political branch’s acts in its maiden declaration of invalidity.  Time 
matters again.  When Interpretation No. 218 was promulgated on August 
14, 1987, the ground for political liberalization in Taiwan had been readily 
prepared.  It was not by chance that the TCC made its first frontal strike 
against the political branch exactly one month after martial law was for-
mally lifted on July 15, 1987.  Nevertheless, the character of political rule 
remained authoritarian in Taiwan as the KMT still kept a firm grip on the 
political power with the help of the (rump) First Legislative Yuan elected 
in China in 1948.168  In line with the symbolic Interpretation No. 210, the 
TCC struck the political branch with gentle grace in Interpretation No. 
218: striking down the political branch’s unconstitutional act while delay-
ing the invalidation for six months.
In the postmartial law era, the TCC kept up its new constitu-
tional posturing.  Between the historic Interpretation No. 218 and the 
well-commented “bootstrapping” Interpretation No. 261 of June 21, 
1990 whereby the very long parliament (1948–91) was put to rest,169 the 
TCC made another two declarations of invalidity vis-à-vis the political 
branch’s acts.170  Notably, both Interpretation Nos. 224 and 251 were dec-
larations of invalidity as to statutes and were attached with a remedial 
grace period.  The former concerned a statute on taxation; the latter was 
a sequel to the toothless Interpretation No. 166, whose Delphic intima-
tions of the constitutional incompatibility of the pre-constitutional Police 
Punishment Act had fallen flat on its face since its promulgation ten years 
ago.  At that time, not only administrative rules but also primary leg-
islation was within the TCC’s strike distance, though the TCC’s strike 
remained gentle.  It was not until Interpretation No. 268, issued nearly 
five months after Interpretation No. 261, that the TCC struck down a 
political branch’s act with an immediate declaration of invalidity for the 
first time in its history.171
168. See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1010–11.
169. See Yeh, supra note 75, at 40–41.  For the concept of judicial bootstrapping 
and the bootstrapping character of Interpretation No. 261, see Lin et al., supra note 67, 
at 1011; see also Kuo, supra note 106, at 604.
170. During that period, the TCC also made an immediate and ex tunc decla-
ration of invalidity as to the ban on polygamy in the civil code in Interpretation No. 
242 in 1989.  Yet, it was an outlier in every aspect.  Formally, it was a declaration of 
invalidity with immediate and retroactive effects.  In essence, it was a read-down of the 
polygamy ban provision in the civil code to redress the petitioner’s unique personal 
circumstance.  The petitioner had married his first wife in China before he settled in 
Taiwan after 1949.  Later he married his Taiwanese wife because of the long frozen 
Chinese civil war.  In 1987, the Taiwan Supreme Court annulled the petitioner’s second 
marriage on the application from the petitioner’s Chinese wife from his first marriage. 
As many of those who migrated to Taiwan after 1949 were in the same situation, the 
TCC made the extraordinary Interpretation No. 242 to avert the annulment of numer-
ous marriages officiated in Taiwan after 1949.  Notably, the impugned provision of the 
civil code has since remained unchanged.
171. Interpretation No. 268 (1990) (invalidating an administrative rule).  In In-
terpretation No. 264 (1990), the TCC formally issued a declaration of invalidity as to 
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The story from then on is one well told: the TCC emerged as the 
constitution’s reliable guardian and democracy’s facilitator with a mix of 
diverse judicial strategic choices, including the granting of remedial grace 
periods.172  Through this lens, the TCC deliberately granted remedial grace 
periods to address the issues the TCC faced in the fulfillment of its insti-
tutional role.  From the perspective of judicial politics, the TCC granted 
remedial grace periods to engage other constitutional players, including 
the political branch and citizens, in democratic dialogues about solutions 
to the unconstitutionality of state acts.  Through engagement instead of 
confrontation, the TCC helped to facilitate Taiwan’s transition to con-
stitutional democracy by strategically granting remedial grace periods 
when it tackled the political branch’s unconstitutional acts.173  Alterna-
tively, as with the GFCC’s approach to safeguarding the integrity of the 
German constitution through managing the legal effects of unconstitu-
tionality, the granting of remedial grace periods was the TCC’s deliberate 
choice to uphold the rule of law principle by striking balance between 
constitutional integrity and legal certainty.174  Both take the view that 
the granting of remedial grace periods was the TCC’s deliberate choice. 
Does the granting of remedial grace periods really result from choice?
2. Beyond Strategic Choice: The Road Toward Grace by Default
As indicated in Part II, the TCC has granted remedial grace periods 
in a wide range of subjects.  Against this backdrop, the theory based on 
the strategy of institutional dialogue is less convincing than it seems as it 
holds that the TCC’s strategic choices to engage the political branch in 
solving the unconstitutionality of the latter’s acts converged on the grant-
ing of remedial grace periods across diverse cases.  As most cases attached 
with remedial grace periods centered on bridging rather than the more 
dialogical nudging (or hedging), the claimed dialogical function of grant-
ing remedial grace periods is even more ambiguous.  Moreover, given the 
high percentage (around 30 percent) of the political branch’s inaction 
vis-à-vis its bridging judgments, it is hard to see why the TCC failed to 
reconsider its strategy.  The judicial dialogic argument does not fly.
The rule of law argument does not carry the explanation of the 
TCC’s frequent use of remedial grace periods as a result of institutional 
choice very far, either.  As the TCC has granted remedial grace periods 
in such diverse situations, the suggestion that they all resulted from the 
a parliamentary resolution requesting the increase of government expenditure in the 
legislative vetting of the government budget bill.  Given that the administration had 
already expressed its intent not to be bound by the impugned resolution, Interpreta-
tion No. 264 actually rendered that resolution nonbinding rather than invalid.  It raised 
the question of the TCC’s role in the interdepartmental conflict within the political 
branch.  See Kuo, supra note 106.
172. See Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 106–57; Yeh, supra note 75, at 174–91; Lin et 
al., supra note 67, at 1011–14.
173. Yeh, supra note 75, at 181–83; Yeh, supra note 86, at 15–20.
174. See Hwang, supra note 116, at 40.
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TCC’s careful balance of constitutional integrity and legal certainty is 
unconvincing.175  Had the diverse use of remedial grace periods been the 
result of balancing according to the rule of law principle, this would sug-
gest that the TCC tipped the rule of law balance in favor of legal certainty 
by default.  If so, the TCC’s use of remedial grace periods is more of a 
default option than a deliberate choice in judicial remedy.
True, to say that the TCC has granted remedial grace periods 
almost by default does not mean that the TCC has automatically pre-
scribed a grace period to any new judgement without considering the 
issues before it.  As discussed in Part II, the TCC has consciously tweaked 
its use of remedial grace periods to prod the political branch into action 
in face of new challenges resulting from structural issues or unconsti-
tutional under-/over-inclusive legislation.  The problem is that bridging, 
the original model, has remained to be the staple of the TCC’s use of 
remedial grace periods since the steep rise of granting grace periods in 
2007,176 even though nudging and hedging are more suitable choices for 
such issues.177   Again, this defeats the explanation based on the TCC’s 
institutional choice when confronted with complex constitutional issues.
Another possible choice-based explanation is based on the correla-
tion between the sharp increase in the use of remedial grace periods and 
the replacement of the Sixth Council with Grand Justices appointed to 
staggered terms.178  On this view, with the resulting weakening of ideo-
logical homogeneity, remedial grace periods may have been invoked as 
the medium to bring the Grand Justices together in face of the two-thirds 
majority required for constitutional review of statutes.179  Viewed thus, 
the granting of remedial grace periods appeared to help to bridge the gap 
between the Grand Justices who were more assertive about the TCC’s 
ordained constitutional guardianship and those who were more sympa-
thetic to the political branch’s position.180
There are some pieces missing from this explanation.  As indicated 
in Table 1, the granting of remedial grace periods increased steeply after 
October 1, 2007 when the terms of the sitting Grand Justices began to 
become staggered, with the percentage spiking to over 60 percent.  To 
replace the retired Grand Justices appointed in 2003 for a four-year term, 
the new Grand Justices were appointed in 2007 by the same DPP pres-
ident who had appointed the holdovers for an eight-year term in 2003. 
It was not until a year later that another cohort appointed by the new 
175. Cf. id.
176. See supra Table 1.
177. This proposition was not borne out until 2016.  In the period 2016–18, there 
have been thirteenth interpretations attached with a remedial grace period: four 
bridging judgments, two nudging judgment, and seven hedging judgments.  Given the 
short period, however, it is unclear that a pattern is emerging.
178. See supra text accompanying note 76.
179. This is set to be changed with the coming into effect of the new Constitu-
tional Litigation Act in 2022.  See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1025.
180. Yeh, supra note 86, at 24–26.
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KMT president joined the TCC.  Yet, between October 1, 2007 and Octo-
ber 31, 2008, during which all sitting Grand Justices were appointed by 
the same president, the TCC prescribed remedial grace periods six times 
in its nine judgments of unconstitutionality.181  This shows that before 
the appearance of ideological divide in November 2008, the percentage 
had already risen sharply.  Seen in this light, the post–2007 change has 
more to do with the personnel replacement, including the longest serv-
ing President-Grand Justice Weng’s retirement in 2007,182 than ideological 
differences.
Another reason that the ideological difference-based explanation 
does not hold water is that the TCC was virtually sidelined in significant 
constitutional cases in the period 2008–16.183  The cases coming before 
the TCC during that period did not bear on underlying ideological dif-
ferences among Grand Justices, which would have to be bridged by the 
employment of remedial grace periods.  Building majority by bridging 
ideological divide thus fails to account for the continuing increase on 
the use of remedial grace periods when the TCC steered clear of conten-
tious constitutional issues.184  In addition, the TCC’s recent move from the 
lame nudging to the biting hedging belies the majority-building explana-
tion as such move would only intensify the fighting between the opposing 
camps among the Grand Justices.  In sum, managing ideological differ-
ences does not explain the continuing growth of remedial grace periods 
in the TCC case law.
If none of the above explanations suffice, what on earth has made 
the TCC continue to look to remedial grace periods in dealing with the 
political branch’s unconstitutional acts?  Look beyond the horizon of 
institutional choices.  As noted above, the TCC granted a remedial grace 
period in its first declaration of invalidity following the lifting of martial 
law in Taiwan.185  Yet, without the innovative technique of remedial grace 
periods, the wait would have been much longer for the TCC’s departure 
from its past practice of Delphically intimating the constitutional incom-
patibility of the political branch’s acts in its formative stage.  Seen in this 
genealogical light, suspended declarations of invalidity in the form of 
bridging judgments emerged as the TCC’s archetype of strike against the 
political branch’s unconstitutional acts when the TCC was rising from its 
formative years.
As indicated in Table 1, October 2007 is the watershed in the TCC’s 
employment of remedial grace periods.  It is when President-Grand Jus-
tice Weng, the last Grand Justice who took part in the first granting of a 
181. Those six interpretations are Interpretation Nos. 636, 638, 640, 641, 645, and 
649.
182. Justice Weng was first appointed to the Third Council of Grand Justices as 
an Associate Grand Justice in 1972.  See Judicial Yuan, supra note 73, at 288.
183. Kuo, supra note 106, at 625–39.
184. Id. at 625–33.
185. Interpretation No. 218 (1987).
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remedial grace period in 1987,186 retired from the TCC.  Since then, over half 
of the total of 86 cases attached with a remedial grace period have been 
issued.187  With the TCC’s collegiate memory fading at President-Grand 
Justice Weng’s retirement and its formative experience of striking by 
bridging receding into the background of institutional consciousness,188 
the frequent granting of remedial grace periods reflects the TCC’s sedi-
mented position on judicial remedy, despite the tweaks of nudging and 
hedging.  Moreover, as the foregoing discussion of the augmented edi-
tion of hedging interpretations—the recent mutation of remedial grace 
periods—has suggested, the TCC’s granting of remedial grace periods in 
such interpretations was more symbolic than functional as the TCC could 
achieve the same effect by making a straightforward declaration of inva-
lidity and prescribing a more detailed interim measure.189  This new twist 
on remedial grace periods testifies to the influence of institutional prac-
tice on the TCC’s habitual prescription of grace periods.  Taken together, 
bridging, nudging, and hedging (simpliciter and augmented) are a func-
tion of the TCC’s default option in unconstitutionality management set 
at the dawning of Taiwan’s transition to constitutional democracy.
Conclusion
Remedial grace periods have been in the toolkit of apex courts for 
decades but only comes to the fore in comparative constitutional law 
recently thanks to scholarship on constitutional review in the common 
law jurisdictions.  Through this lens, the granting of remedial grace peri-
ods is treated as part of remedial measures in constitutional review, while 
the focus is on how “biting” a suspended declaration of invalidity is.190 
Looking beyond the common law realm, this Article has argued that vari-
ations on the use of remedial grace periods reflect how the concept of 
unconstitutionality is understood and how its consequences are managed 
in different legal traditions.  Through a case study of Taiwan in a compara-
tive light, this Article has shown how the court’s role vis-à-vis the political 
branch in the dynamics of constitutional politics and the legal tradition 
jointly contribute to the multifunctional role of remedial grace periods in 
186. Id.
187. Forty-seven judgments attached with a remedial grace period have been is-
sued during this period.
188. This needs to be distinguished from the collegiality claim that because of 
the weakening of collegiality following the staggering of the terms of Grand Justices, 
the TCC turned to remedial grace periods as a means to build the crucial two-thirds 
majority.  It is true that the weakening of collegiality may make reaching a unani-
mous judgment harder and this explains the TCC’s recent move toward a “plurivocal 
court.”  See Lin et al., supra note 67, at 1025–26.  For the notion of a plurivocal court, 
see Mitchel de S.-O.-L’E. Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis 
of Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy 244–45 (2004).  Nevertheless, it is unclear 
whether collegiality bears on the judgment as to the impugned state act’s constitution-
al conformity.
189. See supra text accompanied by notes 144–47.
190. See Yap, supra note 8, at 37–39.
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unconstitutionality management.  On the one hand, in light of compara-
tive constitutional review, the TCC’s granting of remedial grace periods 
does not consist with theoretical models built on the common law juris-
dictions.  Rather, as with the civilian-continental model of constitutional 
review, remedial grace periods in Taiwan were not always attached to dec-
larations of invalidity but have functionally evolved in forms of bridging, 
nudging, and hedging as part of the judicial strategy to rein in the political 
branch under the conceptual framework of graduated unconstitutional-
ity.  On the other hand, remedial grace periods have been instrumental 
to the TCC’s realization of its institutional potential in constitutional 
review.  Thanks to such measures, the TCC could strike the still untamed 
political branch with gentle grace when Taiwan was just ridding herself of 
the authoritarian yoke.  The TCC’s continuing and frequent prescription 
for remedial grace periods in the post–martial law era is indicative of its 
default position in constitutional remedies informed by the civilian-con-
tinental model and molded in its formative experience at the dawn of 
democratization.  In a comparative light, the granting of remedial grace 
periods is not just a strategic choice in constitutional remedies.  The sig-
nificance of remedial grace periods only becomes clear in light of legal 
tradition and the politics of unconstitutionality management.
